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“The enemy of good is better.”1 
 
ABSTRACT 
Orthopaedic surgical devices are recalled 11.5 times more when they ob-
tain U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) clearance by Premarket No-
tification (“510(k)”) than when they are cleared via the more vigorous Pre-
market Approval (“PMA”) review.  Recall of implanted orthopaedic devices 
can be devastating for patients – especially if the device must be removed or 
revised.  510(k) approval is also associated with other negative outcome issues 
among orthopaedic devices – including outlier devices, new devices underper-
forming their predicate ancestors, and significant statistical risks – which are 
discussed in this paper.  In November 2018, the FDA announced changes to 
510(k) including: (1) increasing premarket expectations for device submis-
sions, (2) implementing a “Refuse-to-Accept” policy for incomplete applica-
tions, (3) improving the consistency and thoroughness of device review, (4) 
eliminating the use of 510(k) for devices considered to be of higher risk (i.e., 
Class III devices), and (5) eliminating over 1000 devices as 510(k) legal pred-
icates.  This article (1) explores the recent changes to 510(k) outlined by the 
FDA in 2018, (2) evaluates their likely effects on the outcomes of orthopaedic 
devices, and (3) proposes solutions to improve those outcomes, including FDA 
regulatory changes, litigation changes with regard to informed consent and 
Daubert rulings, and Congressional actions to hold device manufacturers more 
accountable based upon models currently in place affecting hospitals, doctors, 




* Dr. Griffin is the Health Law Scholar in Residence and Adjunct Professor at the Uni-
versity of Arkansas School of Law and is an Adjunct Clinical Assistant Professor, Di-
vision of Orthopaedic Surgery, University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences.   
 1. English variant of Italian proverb popularized by Voltaire in the 1600s. See 
SUSAN RATCLIFFE, CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 389 (6th ed. 2011). 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Orthopaedic surgical devices are recalled 11.5 times more commonly 
when they obtain FDA clearance by Premarket Notification (“510(k)”) than 
when they are cleared via the more vigorous Premarket Approval (“PMA”) 
review.2  Recall of implanted orthopaedic devices that have been affixed to or 
implanted within a large bone, like the femur, can be devastating for patients – 
especially if the device must be removed or revised.  For example, Medicare 
patients undergoing revision total hip replacements are at risk for infection 
(17.3%), blood clots (i.e., venous thromboembolic disease; 11.1%), dislocation 
(5.43%), pulmonary embolism (3.24%), and death (2.11%).3  Due to the sig-
nificant potential for life-altering consequences of revision of recalled medical 
devices affixed to or implanted within large bones, recall of orthopaedic de-
vices is unacceptable and the FDA should optimize orthopaedic device clear-
ance pathways to minimize the chances that approved devices will later be re-
called.   
The FDA clears implantable medical devices using two main pathways:  
PMA review and 510(k).4  The PMA pathway is longer, more expensive, and 
requires clinical trials confirming safety and efficacy.5  The law presumes that 
implantable medical devices will undergo PMA review;6 but 510(k) provides 
a shortcut for most devices if the manufacturer/marketer (“submitter”) can 
show that the new device is “at least as safe and effective” (i.e., “substantially 
equivalent”) as a device that is already being legally marketed (i.e., a “predi-
cate” device).7  The 510(k) program is the most common pre-market regulatory 
  
 2. Charles S. Day et al., Analysis of FDA-Approved Orthopaedic Devices and 
Their Recalls, 98 J. BONE & JOINT SURGERY 517, 517 (2016) (concluding, “Given that 
510(k)-cleared devices were 11.5 times more likely to be recalled than PMA-approved 
devices, it is concerning that most orthopaedic devices are cleared through the 510(k) 
process with limited clinical trials data.”). 
 3. Sameer Badarudeen et al., Complications After Revision Total Hip Arthro-
plasty in the Medicare Population, 32 J. ARTHROPLASTY 1954, 1954 (2017). 
 4. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 477–79 (1996) (noting that the 510(k) 
notification process is not comparable to the PMA process because the 510(k) review 
is “completed in an average of only twenty hours” whereas 1200 hours is necessary to 
complete a PMA review); see also Day et al., supra note 2, at 518 (describing 510(k) 
and PMA pathways); Kyle M. Fargen et al., The FDA Approval Process for Medical 
Devices: An Inherently Flawed System or a Valuable Pathway for Innovation?, 5 J. 
NEUROINTERVENTIONAL SURGERY 269, 271–72 (2013) (describing the approval path-
ways for medical devices). 
 5. 21 U.S.C. § 360e (2012). 
 6. § 360c(c)(2)(C)(1); § 360c(a)(1)(C) 
 7. § 360c(2)(C)(ii)(II); § 360c(c)(2)(C) (noting the 510(k) pathway allows for 
rapid approval of medical devices that are “substantially equivalent” to existing legally-
marketed devices); 21 CFR § 807.92(a)(3) (2019); Premarket Notification 510(k), U.S. 
3
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review pathway for new medical devices.8  In 2017, the FDA cleared 82% of 
its approved or cleared devices via the 510(k) pathway.9 
In November 2018, the FDA announced changes to 510(k).10  In response 
to vociferous criticism of 510(k), the FDA asked the Institute of Medicine 
(“IOM”) to review 510(k) in 2011 and to make recommendations to protect the 
public health while also protecting legitimate industry interests.11  The IOM 
concluded that the 510(k) process was fatally “flawed,”12 that it generally does 
not evaluate safety and efficacy, and cannot be transformed into such a pro-
cess.13  In addition, the IOM noted that 510(k) “lacks the statutory basis to be 
a reliable premarket screen for safety and effectiveness” of moderate risk de-
vices and recommended that Congress replace the system.14  However, Con-
gress failed to act.   
  
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/premarket-submis-
sions/premarket-notification-510k [perma.cc/EZ4W-U2S3]; see Medtronic, Inc., 518 
U.S. at 478; Day, supra note 2, at 518. 
 8. FDA has taken steps to strengthen the 510(k) Program, U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN. 3 (November 2018), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOf-
fices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDRH/CDRHReports/UCM626541.pdf 
[perma.cc/2KNP-L6KM] [hereinafter, FDA Steps to Strengthen 510(k)]. 
 9. Id.   
 10. Id.  
 11. See generally INST. OF MED., MEDICAL DEVICES AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH, 
MEDICAL DEVICES AND PUBLIC’S HEALTH: THE FDA 510(K) CLEARANCE PROCESS AT 
35 YEARS (2011), https://www.nap.edu/read/13150/ [hereinafter IOM REPORT]; see, 
Barry Meier, The Implants Loophole, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2010), https://www.ny-
times.com/2010/12/17/business/17hip.html [perma.cc/F9AF-SZMM] (reporting on po-
tential problems with several devices that had been cleared through the 510(k) process, 
including an artificial hip); Dangerous Medical Implants and Devices: Most Medical 
Implants Have Never Been Tested for Safety, CONSUMER REPS. (May 2012), http://con-
sumerreports.org/cro/magazine/2012/04/cr-investigates-dangerous-medical-de-
vices/index.htm [perma.cc/Q8UR-KEHQ] (detailing deficiencies in products as a result 
of the 501(k) process); Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. Vows to Revoke Approval of Device, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2010), https://nyti.ms/2JS67WH [perma.cc/Y595-Q9U4] (noting 
that politics trumped science in the approval of a knee patch); Gardiner Harris, U.S. 
Inaction Lets Look-Alike Tubes Kill Patients, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2010), 
https://nyti.ms/2mfjDI6 [perma.cc/F6NA-2CN9] (noting resistance from the medical 
device industry and an approval process that discourages safety-related changes as fac-
tors in deaths related to some tubing connections); Alicia Mundy & Jared A. Favole, 
FDA Rips Approval of Medical Device, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 25, 2009), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB125382260933538517 [perma.cc/6RKP-9LRH] (not-
ing that Congressional pressure damaged the integrity of the FDA’s approval process). 
 12. IOM REPORT, supra note 11, at 3.  
 13. Id. at 2–3.    
 14. Id. at 2.   
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The FDA’s recent 510(k) changes15 appear to be an attempt to address 
some of the concerns and offset Congress’ lack of action.  The FDA’s Novem-
ber 2018 report outlined changes to strengthen the program, including: (1) in-
creasing premarket expectations for device submissions, (2) implementing a 
“Refuse-to-Accept” policy for incomplete applications, (3) improving the con-
sistency and thoroughness of device review, (4) eliminating the use of 510(k) 
for devices considered to be of higher risk (i.e., Class III devices), and (5) elim-
inating over 1000 devices as 510(k) legal predicates.16   
First, this Article explores the recent changes to 510(k) outlined by the 
FDA in 2018.  Then, it evaluates their likely effects on the outcomes of ortho-
paedic devices.  Finally, this Article proposes solutions to improve those out-
comes.     
II.  FDA’S RECENT CHANGES TO THE 510(K) PATHWAY 
Late in 2018, the FDA announced changes to the 510k pathway to 
“strengthen” the path and highlighted some of the changes that have been oc-
curring over the past several years.17  These changes include that the FDA has 
(1) “increased its premarket expectations for 510(k) submissions,” (2) “imple-
mented a Refuse-To-Accept policy to improve the quality of 510(k) submis-
sions,” (3) “improved consistency and thoroughness of 510(k) review,” (4) 
“taken steps to eliminate the use of 510(k) for Class III devices,” and (5) “elim-
inated the use of more than 1000 510(k)s as legal predicates.” 18   
A.  Increased Premarket Expectations for 510(k) Submissions 
According to the FDA’s report, the increased premarket expectations are 
primarily (1) the completion of more pages of paperwork and (2) the incorpo-
ration of benefit/risk factors into the paperwork analysis.19    
1.  More pages of paperwork 
In 2017, the FDA updated its 510(k) Modifications Guidance for compa-
nies making changes to existing devices,20 including how to incorporate Bene-
fit-Risk Factors.21  The FDA’s Center for Devices and Radiological Health 
(“CDRH”) published over 50 guidance documents since 2009 “to help improve 
  
 15. FDA Steps to Strengthen 510(k), supra note 8. 
 16. Id. at 2.    
 17. Id.  
 18. Id. at 2.  
 19. Id. at 4.    
 20. Id.   
 21. Id.   
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predictability, consistency, and transparency of submission content while clar-
ifying expectations, policies[,] and procedures surrounding review of the sub-
mission.”22  The “average number of pages for each 510(k) has increased 150% 
since 2009” such that the average number of pages was 1,185 for each 510(k) 
submission in 2017.23   
2.  Incorporation of Benefit/Risk factors  
The FDA encourages inclusion of benefit and risk factors in the 510(k) 
application and notes that benefit and risk factors are considered during assess-
ment of devices; the FDA provides examples of benefits and risks that should 
be included.24   
Possible device benefits may include (among others): (1) “Reduction in 
treatment time to achieve same effect”; (2) “Improvement of mechanical prop-
erties to reduce probable likelihood of adverse events or to improve handling”; 
(3) “Reduction of variability in device output”; and (4) “Improvements in clin-
ical management, probability of survival, other aspects of patient health status 
(e.g., effect on patient management and quality of life, improvement of patient 
function, prevention of loss of function, relief from symptoms), and patient 
satisfaction in the target population, which may be measured with the use of 
PROs.”25  In considering benefits, the FDA assesses information provided in 
the 510(k) by comparing potential benefits to the predicate device.26    
Possible device risks are likewise considered.  In assessing risks, the FDA 
considers “among others, the following factors individually and in the aggre-
gate as compared to the predicate device: (1) Severity, Types, Number, and 
Rates of Harmful events; (2) Probability of a Harmful Event; (3) Probability of 
the Patient Experiencing One or More Harmful Events; and (4) Duration of 
Harmful Events.”27  Risk assessment is discussed further below in relation to 
orthopaedic devices.   
Additional factors considered in the benefit/risk assessment include (1) 
uncertainty, (2) characterization of the disease/condition, (3) innovative tech-
nology, (4) patient tolerance for risk and perspective on benefit, (5) benefit for 
  
 22. Id.   
 23. Id.  
 24. Id.  
 25. Benefit-Risk Factors to Consider When Determining Substantial Equivalence 
in Premarket Notifications (510(k)) with Different Technological Characteristics, U.S. 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 12–13 (2018), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Medi-
calDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/UCM404773.pdf 
[perma.cc/M836-UJVH] [hereinafter FDA BENEFIT-RISK FACTORS]. 
 26. Id. at 13–14 (considering the following in comparison to the predicate device: 
(1) magnitude of benefits, (2) probability of the patient experiencing benefits, and (3) 
duration of effects).   
 27. Id. at 14–15.   
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the health care professional or caregiver, (6) risk mitigation, and (7) postmarket 
data.28     
B.  Refuse-To-Accept Policy 
To determine whether an application is administratively complete, the 
FDA does a review within 15 days of receipt.29  The FDA updated its “Refuse-
to-Accept” policy in January 2018; procedures were implemented, including 
criteria to assess “whether a 510(k) submission meets a quality threshold of 
acceptability for review” by evaluating submissions for completeness related 
to 52 elements – including biocompatibility, shelf life, performance data, and 
others.30  If any one of the 52 elements is missing, the submitter is notified that 
the submission is not accepted for review; roughly 30% fall into this category 
initially.31  This is not a substantive review, just an initial checklist review for 
completeness of the application.32   
C.  Improved Consistency and Thoroughness 
To improve consistency and thoroughness, the FDA created the 510(k) 
SMART memo template for use by FDA reviewers for guidance during the 
510(k) premarket process.33  The  FDA instituted the SMART memo template 
for mandatory use beginning in October 2015, and it guides the FDA’s review 
staff “by providing helpful links to applicable regulations and guidances [sic] 
and facilitating consistent analysis and documentation of scientific, clinical, 
administrative and regulatory information.” 34  In addition, “the SMART memo 
template is frequently updated to incorporate new review practices and poli-
cies, such as those published in final guidance to ensure a contemporary ap-
proach to 510(k) review” and includes “foundational and device-specific guid-
ance.”35  In addition, the SMART memo template training has been incorpo-
rated into the FDA’s Reviewer Certification Program.36 
  
 28. Id. at 16–18.   
 29. Refuse to Accept Policy for 510(k)s, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 3 (2019), 
https://www.fda.gov/media/83888/download [perma.cc/4G5P-4CDS] [hereinafter 
FDA Refuse to Accept Policy].   
 30. FDA Steps to Strengthen 510(k), supra note 8, at 5.   
 31. Id. at 5.   
 32. FDA Refuse to Accept Policy, supra note 29, at 3 (noting the purpose of the 
policy is to “whether a 510(k) submission meets a minimum threshold of acceptability 
and should be accepted for substantive review”).    
 33. FDA Steps to Strengthen 510(k), supra note 8, at 6. 
 34. Id. at 6.   
 35. Id.   
 36. Id.   
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As a result, the FDA’s staff now spends more time reviewing each 510(k) 
submission “than ever before.”37  This is partially due to the 150% increase in 
the number of pages involved in each submission.38  The FDA estimates that 
its reviewers now spend twice as much time reviewing each 510(k) as they did 
just fifteen years ago and 32% more time than they did in 2009.39  Even with 
these increased time commitments, “the FDA has continued to meet its Con-
gressionally established review performance timelines.”40 
D.  Elimination of 510(k) for Class III Devices 
The FDA’s “oversight of devices is tailored to three risk-based classifica-
tion[s]”: Classes I, II, and III.41  Class I devices make up around 50% of all 
medical devices, are considered least risky, and can generally be marketed in 
the United States without prior FDA review.42  Elastic bandages and color 
change thermometers are examples of Class I devices.43  Orthopaedic examples 
include basic manual surgical instruments44 (e.g., needle holders, scissors, 
rongeurs, etc.), cast removal instruments,45 etc.46  Class I device makers are 
subject to “reporting, labeling, and good manufacturing practice require-
ments.”47    
Class II devices make up about 43% of all medical devices and generally 
require FDA review of 510(k) submissions.48  Examples include glucose test 
strips and infusion pumps.49  Orthopaedic examples include most primary total 
  
 37. Id.   
 38. Id. (noting “Since 2009, the time spent reviewing each 510(k) submission has 
increased 32%, and it has almost doubled in the past 15 years.”). 
 39. Id.  
 40. Id.    
 41. Medical Device Safety Action Plan: Protecting Patients, Promoting Public 
Health, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 3 (2018), https://www.fda.gov/me-
dia/112497/download [perma.cc/U5QP-EE3E] [hereinafter FDA Safety Action Plan].   
 42. Id. at 3.  
 43. Id.  
 44. 21 C.F.R. § 888.4540 (2019). 
 45. § 888.5960. 
 46. For a complete list of medical devices, see generally 20 C.F.R. § 888.  
 47. FDA Safety Action Plan, supra note 41, at 3. 
 48. Id.  
 49. Id.  
8
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol84/iss3/8
2019] ORTHOPAEDIC SURGICAL DEVICES 787 
knee replacement devices,50 most primary total hip replacement devices,51 in-
tramedullary fixation rods,52 PMMA bone cement,53 thoracolumbosacral pedi-
cle screw system,54 plate/screw fixation devices,55 and others.56  In 2017, the 
FDA approved over 3000 class II devices.57   
Class III devices are those “with [the] greatest risk to patients.”58  Class 
III devices generally require Premarket Applications (“PMAs”) “containing 
clinical and nonclinical data to determine whether there is a reasonable assur-
ance of safety and effectiveness.”59  Prior to 2018, some Class III devices could 
be cleared via 510(k).60  But as a result of these recent changes, “not a single 
Class III device was cleared via the 510(k) process in 2018.”61  In 2017, the 
FDA approved 64 PMA devices.62  Orthopaedic examples of Class III devices 
include some metal on metal hips (as of 2016 after lawsuits), constrained total 
knees, knee hemiarthroplasty, and others.63    
  
 50. 21 C.F.R. §§ 888.3490, 3500, 3520 (2019). 
 51. §§ 888.3340, 3350, 3353, 3358, 3360, 3390. 
 52. §§ 888.3020, 3023. 
 53. § 888.3027.  
 54. § 888.3070. 
 55. § 888.3030. 
 56. For a complete list of medical devices, see generally 20 C.F.R. § 888 (2019). 
 57. FDA Steps to Strengthen 510(k), supra note 8, at 3 (noting 3173 devices were 
cleared in 2017); see also, 510(K) DEVICES CLEARED IN 2017, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 
(2018), https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/Device-
ApprovalsandClearances/510kClearances/ucm540522.htm [perma.cc/9KU9-QWPT] 
(last visited February 5, 2019). 
 58. FDA Steps to Strengthen 510(k), supra note 8, at 7.   
 59. Id.; FDA Safety Action Plan, supra note 41, at 3. 
 60. FDA Steps to Strengthen 501(k), supra note 8, at 7.  
Class III devices must generally obtain an approved Premarket Approval (PMA) appli-
cation, but some device types on the market prior to the 1976 Medical Device Amend-
ments were placed into Class III and may be cleared via the 510(k) process until the 
FDA issues regulations either requiring submission of a Premarket Approval applica-
tion or down-classifying the device types into Class I or Class II.  Between 2003 and 
2009, the FDA annually cleared approximately 80 submissions for Class III devices 
through the 510(k) process.  As of August 2009, 25 Class III device types were still 
eligible for the 510(k) process.  Between 2011 and 2016, the FDA published 24 final 
rules and orders, either down-classifying the device types to Class I or Class II or re-
quiring the submission of a Premarket Approval application and eliminating the use of 
the 510(k) process for evaluation of these high-risk medical devices. Id. 
 61. Id.   
 62. FDA Safety Action Plan, supra note 41, at 3.   
 63. 21 CFR §§ 888.3320, 888.3330 (2019) (metal on metal hips); § 888.3550 (con-
strained total knee); § 888.3570 (knee hemiarthroplasty).  For a complete list of medical 
devices, see generally 20 C.F.R. § 888 (2019). 
9
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E.  Elimination of More Than 1000 Devices as Legal Predicates 
The FDA takes action to eliminate the use of devices previously cleared 
by 510(k) as predicates “when it raises safety concerns.”64  For example, the 
FDA may reclassify a device from Class II to Class III and call for Premarket 
Approval applications “when [it] determine[s] that a device type should be reg-
ulated as high risk because general and special controls are not sufficient to 
assure its safety and effectiveness.”65  This process eliminates some previously 
cleared 510(k)s as legal predicates.66  Elimination of predicates has become 
more common in recent years, with 84% of predicates being eliminated in the 
past 6 years and a thirty-fold increase in the annual rate of elimination of 510(k) 
predicates since 2012.67  A total of 1,477 predicates have been eliminated since 
2012.68 
III.  ORTHOPAEDIC IMPLANTS, 510(K), AND LIKELY EFFECTS OF FDA 
CHANGES 
In addition to the fact that 510(k) leads to an 11.5 times higher risk of 
device recall than PMA for orthopaedic devices, there have been other negative 
side effects of 510(k) on orthopaedic devices.  This section first reviews the 
history of 510(k) orthopaedic device concerns using a few specific examples.  
Then, with that orthopaedic device history in mind, this section analyzes the 
FDA’s 2018 changes to strengthen 510(k).   
A.  510(k) and Orthopaedic Implants 
The 510(k) program has affected orthopaedic implants in three distinct 
ways.  First, 510(k) has facilitated orthopaedic device races with new devices 
often promoted before the patient outcomes of earlier predicate versions can be 
scientifically evaluated.  Second, 510(k) has resulted in some examples of de-
vices with higher and unexpected severe complications for patients than their 
predicate devices.  Third, 510(k) has helped lead to the finding that sometimes 
older predicate orthopaedic devices have better long-term outcomes than their 
510(k) descendants. 
1.  The 510(k) facilitated orthopaedic device “races” 
From the 1980s through the 2000s, total joint replacement components 
were modified so quickly that there was almost no time for outcome assessment 
  
 64. FDA Steps to Strengthen 510(k), supra note 8, at 8.   
 65. Id.   
 66. Id.   
 67. Id.   
 68. Id.   
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before the next modification hit the market.  Augusto Sarmiento, a well-known 
orthopaedic surgeon, innovator, and leader, observed that one device manufac-
turer’s company president considered the successful outcomes of an earlier ver-
sion of one total hip to be “totally irrelevant data” to consider in the next ver-
sion.69  Sarmiento is a former president of the American Academy of Ortho-
paedic Surgeons70 and former chairman of the Department of Orthopaedic Sur-
gery at the University of Southern California.71 The company president ex-
plained to Dr. Sarmiento that “by the time his company released a new pros-
thesis to the public, they had already begun work on the next version.”72  Be-
cause of this, there was no time for scientific analysis and feedback from pa-
tients and surgeons on the earlier version – often possibly a “predicate” device 
– to be considered in the next device.  In a recent Mayo Clinic study, research-
ers similarly observed “newer and more expensive implants are rapidly adopted 
in clinical practice with limited evidence of their effectiveness in comparison 
with existing ones.”73   
As an example, the evolution of one part of the total knee replacement – 
the tibial component – demonstrates the phenomenon.  The modern total knee 
arthroplasty (“TKA” or “total knee replacement”) consists of three parts: (1) 
the tibial component, (2) the femoral component, and (3) the patellar compo-
nent.74  The tibial component attaches to the lower leg bone (tibia) and is the 
focus of this example.  Numerous companies developed TKAs, but for sim-
plicity, this section will focus mostly on one company’s line with which I am 
most familiar75 and note that other companies’ TKAs developed along some-
what parallel timelines.   
  
 69. AUGUSTO SARMIENTO, M.D., BARE BONES: A SURGEON’S TALE: THE PRICE OF 
SUCCESS IN AMERICAN MEDICINE 286 (2003).   
 70. Id. at 9.    
 71. Id.   
 72. Id.   
 73. H.M. Kremers et al., Comparative Survivorship of Different Tibial Designs in 
Primary Total Knee Arthroplasty, 96 J. BONE & JOINT SURG e121, 1 (2014).   
 74. The exact number of modifications to total knee design is likely impossible to 
determine because companies use different terminology in the FDA’s database for total 
knee components.  For example: two hundred, eighty-five entries are found when “total 
knee” is placed in the “device name” field in the FDA’s 510(k) Premarket Notification 
search database. 510(K) PREMARKET NOTIFICATIONS, U.S. FOOD. AND DRUG. ADMIN., 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfpmn/pmn.cfm [perma.cc/VBH7-
GKNJ].  However, additional total knee components are found when searching under 
“tibial,” “femoral,” “patellar,” “polyethylene,” and potentially countless other search 
terms.  Similar findings are likely with regard to the patellar and femoral components.   
 75. Disclosure:  The author implanted Zimmer® NexGen® Legacy™ PS total 
knees throughout his career as an orthopaedic surgeon.  The author completed a fellow-
ship in knee reconstruction and sports medicine under the tutelage of Dr. Insall and his 
colleagues at the Insall-Scott-Kelly (ISK) Institute in New York City in 1996–97 and 
has co-authored several papers with Dr. Insall. See e.g., Frank M. Griffin et al., Accu-
racy of Soft Tissue Balancing in Total Knee Arthroplasty, 15(8) J ARTHROPLASTY 970 
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The tibial component is particularly important to TKA outcomes and has 
been modified via the 510(k) process many times with over 100 different mod-
els being on the market over the past twenty-five years.76  Generally, the tibial 
component began as an all-polyethylene (“all-poly”) device, evolved into a 
fixed polyethylene and metal device (“nonmodular, metal-backed”), and 
emerged into the modular polyethylene and metal device (“modular, metal-
backed”) used most commonly today.77  An early example of a TKA with an 
all-poly tibial component was the Total Condylar Prosthesis (“TCP”; noted as 
the “first total knee of modern design”).78  The TCP was in use prior to the 
Medical Device Amendments of 1976 – known as a pre-amendments device – 
and can serve as a predicate device in the 510(k) process.79  The TCP was mod-
ified at least once after 510(k) approvals began.80  In 1978, the TCP was mod-
ified to become the Insall-Burnstein (“IB1”) knee, still with the all-poly tibial 
  
(2000); Frank M. Griffin et al., The Posterior Condylar Angle in Osteoarthritic Knees, 
13(7) J ARTHROPLASTY 821 (1998); Frank M. Griffin et al., Total Knee Arthroplasty in 
Patients Who Were Obese with 10 Years Follow-up, 356 CLIN ORTHOP REL RES 28 
(1998); Frank M. Griffin et al., Anatomy of the Epicondyles of the Distal Femur, 15(3) 
J ARTHROPLASTY 354 (2000); For a profile of Dr. Insall, see Giles R. Scuderi et al., The 
Insall Legacy in Total Knee Arthroplasty, 392 CLIN ORTHOP REL RES 3–14 (2001).    
 76. Kremers et al., supra note 73, at 6 (noting that “>100 tibial implants are avail-
able in the U.S. market”).   
 77. INSALL ET AL., SURGERY OF THE KNEE 690 (2d ed. 1993); Saverio Comitini et 
al., Evolution in Knee Replacement Implant, 4 SINGLE CELL BIOL. 109, 109 (2014); 
Chitranjan S. Ranawat and Thomas P. Sculco, History of the Development of Total 
Knee Prosthesis at the Hospital for Special Surgery, TOTAL-CONDYLAR KNEE 
ARTHROPLASTY 3–6 (1985); R.D. Scott, Duopatellar Total Knee Replacement: The 
Brigham Experience, 13 ORTHOP CLIN NORTH AM 89–102 (1982);  Luca Amendola et 
al., History of Condylar Total Knee Arthroplasty, RECENT ADVANCES IN HIP AND KNEE 
ARTHROPLASTY 203, 204 (2012).  Also note a discussion of the posterior-stabilized, 
cruciate-sacrificing total knee development versus the cruciate sacrificing knees is be-
yond the scope of this article.   
 78. A.L. Malkani et al., Total Knee Arthroplasty with the Kinematic Condylar 
Prosthesis: A Ten Year Follow-up Study, 77 J. BONE & JOINT SURG. 423 (1995) (noting 
“the total condylar prosthesis is the prototype from which most current total knee pros-
theses were derived” and was introduced in New York City in 1974).   
 79. 21 C.F.R. § 807.92(a)(3) (2019) (noting, “A legally marketed device to which 
a new device may be compared for a determination regarding substantial equivalence 
is a device that was legally marketed prior to May 28, 1976 . . .”); see also, How to 
Market Your Device U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Medi-
calDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/HowtoMarketYourDevice/PremarketSub-
missions/PremarketNotification510k/ [perma.cc/QDH5-RXD2] (last visited June 22, 
2019) (noting submitters “must compare their device to one or more similar legally 
marketed devices and make and support their substantial equivalency claims.”).       
 80. See U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., 510(k) Premarket Notification, 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfpmn/pmn.cfm?ID=K790349 
[perma.cc/L8XV-3SRF] (last updated June 17, 2019).   
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component.81  At least one version of IB1 reached the market via the FDA’s 
510(k) process.82   
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a fixed metal backing was added to the 
all-poly tibial component.83  Researchers believed that the metal backing “im-
prov[ed] the transmission of load across the bone-implant interface” by im-
proving force distribution.84  Surgeons noted that even though the all-poly IB1 
appeared to be performing well, when revisions were performed, “the primary 
mode of failure [was the] loosening of the tibial component due to poor [bone] 
support of the tibial tray.”85  The metal-backed IB1 appears to have been ap-
proved via the 510(k) process in 1981.86 
In the late 1980s, the next big step in tibial component design occurred 
when the metal baseplate became removable or “modular.”87  The old nonmod-
ular tibial component was seen as a primitive design with minimal sizes avail-
able and no side-specific implants.88  “Modularity” meant that the polyethylene 
could be removed and switched to thicker or thinner inserts on top of the metal 
tibial tray at the surgeon’s choosing – giving the surgeon added intraoperative 
flexibility anticipated to improve outcomes due to a “multitude of sizes” along 
with “advanced alignment and cutting tools.”89  In addition, surgeons could add 
metal augments to the metal tray to fill in for bone defects and could attach a 
long stem to the metal tibial post.90  The FDA approved the modular Insall-
Burnstein II (“IB2”) through the 510(k) pathway.91  In the mid-1990s, IB2 
  
 81. Insall et al., The Posterior Stabilized Condylar Prosthesis: A Modification of 
the Total Condylar Design, 64 J. BONE & JOINT SURG. 1317 (1982).   
 82. 510(k) Premarket Notification, supra note 80.  
 83. S. Stern & J. Insall, Posterior Stabilized Prosthesis: Results after Follow-Up 
of 9 to 12 Years, 74 J. BONE & JOINT SURG. 980 (1992). 
 84. Id.; D.L. Bartel et al., Performance of the Tibial Component in Total Knee 
Replacement: Conventional and Revision Designs, 64 J. BONE & JOINT SURG. 1026 
(1982); J.L. Lewis et al., A Comparative of Tibial Component Designs of Total Knee 
Prostheses, 64(1) J. BONE & JOINT SURG. 129 (1982) (noting the single post, metal-
backed design had the lowest stresses); Abdeen et al., Fifteen-Year to 19-Year Follow-
Up of the Insall-Burstein-1 Total Knee Arthroplasty, 25(2) J. ARTHROPLASTY 173 
(2010); G.S. Gill et al., Long-Term Results of Kinematic Condylar Knee Replacement: 
An Analysis of 404 Knees, 83(3) J. BONE & JOINT SURG. 355 (2001). 
 85. Thomas J. Allardyce et al., The Insall-Burstein Posterior Stabilized Condylar 
Knee Prosthesis, SURGICAL TECHNIQUES IN TOTAL KNEE ARTHROPLASTY 67 (2002). 
 86. 510(k) Premarket Notification, supra note 80. 
 87. Giles R. Scuderi et al., The Insall Legacy in Total Knee Arthroplasty, 392 
CLINICAL ORTHOPAEDICS & RELATED RES. 3 (2001).   
 88. W.J. Long et al., Total Knee Replacement in Young, Active Patients: Long-
term Follow-up and Functional Outcome: A Concise Follow-up of a Previous Report, 
96(18) J. BONE & JOINT SURG. AM. e159(1–7) (2014).   
 89. Id. at e159(5).   
 90. Scuderi et al., supra note 87, at 6.   
 91. 510(k) Premarket Notification, supra note 80. 
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evolved into the NexGen Legacy Posterior Stabilized knee.92  The tibial com-
ponent remained a modular metal-backed design but with some changes in the 
shape of the polyethylene part when compared to IB2.93    
While this particular line of TKAs was developing, numerous other com-
panies were likewise developing, modifying, and marketing competing devices 
along a somewhat parallel path to the IB line.94  By the 1990s, modular metal-
backed designs were proliferating.  Almost all knees of the modern era begin-
ning in the 1990s incorporated metal-backed modular tibial components – not 
the all-poly design.95  By the late 1990s, over thirty-seven different models of 
TKAs were being made by fourteen different companies; one researcher noted 
models were changing so fast that published data was difficult to interpret “ow-
ing to the frequent modification of the prostheses.”96  Over 100 tibial compo-
nent designs were marketed from 1985 to 2005 with most no longer on the 
market by 2014.97   
The growth in numbers was massive.  The first “modern” TKAs were 
implanted in the mid-1970s.98  By 1980, around 40,000 TKAs were implanted 
in the U.S. annually.99  The number of TKAs grew rapidly in this lucrative, 
rapidly changing market and more than tripled to 140,000 per year by 1990.100  
In the 2000s, TKA use surged and was expected to continue to grow.  In 2017, 
around 966,000 total knee replacements were implanted,101 and over 3.48 mil-
lion are expected to be implanted annually by 2030.102  As the number of pa-
tients increases, the potential for significant harm related to a poorly analyzed 
  
 92. Scuderi, supra note 87, at 6 (describing the implant that the author (FMG) used 
throughout his orthopaedic career).    
 93. Id.   
 94. R.Y.L. Liow & D. W. Murray, Which Primary Total Knee Replacement: A 
Review of Currently Available TKR in the United Kingdom, 79 ANN. ROYAL C. SURG. 
ENG. 335, 338, 340 (1997).   
 95. Since beginning my orthopaedic residency in 1992, I have never personally 
witnessed a single non-modular tibial component being implanted by any of my pro-
fessors or colleagues, nor did I ever personally implant a non-modular tibial component 
in my career from 1992 through 2013.   
 96. Liow & Murray, supra note 94, at 338, 340.   
 97. Kremers et al., supra note 73, at 6 (noting that “at least half of the implants 
included in our study are no longer available”).   
 98. Scuderi et al., supra note 87, at 3.   
 99. Richard Iorio et al., Chapter 26: Economics of Revision Total Knee Arthro-
plasty: Increasing Prevalence, Decreasing Reimbursement in J.V. BONO, REVISION 
TOTAL KNEE ARTHROPLASTY 269 (2005). 
 100. Id. 
 101. IDATA RESEARCH, Total Knee Replacement Statistics 2017: Younger Patients 
Driving Growth (Jul. 18, 2018), https://idataresearch.com/total-knee-replacement-sta-
tistics-2017-younger-patients-driving-growth/ [perma.cc/283J-AA4D]. 
 102. S. Kurtz et al., Projections of Primary and Revision Hip and Knee Arthroplasty 
in the United States from 2005 to 2030, 89 J. BONE & JOINT SURG. AM. 780, 780 (2007).   
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device likewise increases – especially in an area where there are already de-
vices with proven track records.     
510(k) played an important role in facilitating the rapid evolution of TKA 
designs at a rate that limited researchers’ ability to analyze outcomes because 
devices changed so fast that by the time significant outcome research was avail-
able, the design was already “outdated” and had been replaced by a newer ver-
sion.  Long term patient results of the “TKA races” are now becoming available 
and are discussed below.   
2.  510(k)’s Facilitation of Outlier Device Approval 
The speed with which the FDA approves 510(k) devices and the limited 
information required regarding clinical results has led to approval of at least a 
few outlier devices; some of these outlier devices have had early, allegedly 
poor results – significantly worse than their predicates – and as a result have 
garnered legal attention.  The FDA declares these outlier devices “substantially 
equivalent” to their predicates, but they still can have alarming alleged rates of 
complications leading to significant pain and suffering for affected patients.103  
This Part provides a few examples.   
An example of a nonmodular metal-backed tibial component that alleg-
edly had worse outcomes in the 1980s and received some attention of products 
liability attorneys was the Porous Coated Anatomic (“PCA”) knee.104  The ce-
mented version of PCA was approved via 510(k).105  The design used a thinner 
polyethylene surface that was heat pressed in fixing it to a special metal base.106    
The PCA knee was initially very successful with promising early and in-
termediate term results.107  Eventually, however, excessive wear of the poly-
ethylene part of the tibial component became evident and was often associated 
with implant loosening.108  In one study of 487 consecutive PCA knees, there 
was a 7% failure rate at an average of 4.5 years109 with a projected 20% failure 
  
 103. Medical Devices: Are Current Regulations Doing Enough for Patients?: 
Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Energy and Com., 
111th Cong. (2009) (opening statement of Hon. John D. Dingell, Representative from 
Mich.).  
 104. D.S. Hungerford et al., The Porous-Coated Anatomic Total Knee, 13(1) 
ORTHOP. CLIN. NORTH AM. 103–122 (1982); Amendola et al., supra note 77, at 205; 
Comitini et al., supra note 77, at 109; Soren Toksvig-Larsen et al., Porous Coated An-
atomic Total Knee Arthroplasties, 11 J. ARTHROPLASTY 11, 15 (1996).   
 105. 510(k) Premarket Notification, supra note 80. 
 106. A. Tsao et al., Failure of the Porous Coated Anatomic Prothesis in Total Knee 
Arthroplasty Due to Severe Polyethylene Wear, 75(1) J. BONE & JOINT SURG. AM. 19 
(1993); Hungerford, supra note 104; Amendola, supra note 77, at 205; Comitini et al., 
supra note 77, at 109; Toksvig-Larsen et al., supra note 104.   
 107. Toksvig-Larsen, supra note 104.    
 108. Id.    
 109. Tsao et al., supra note 106, at 19.   
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rate expected at six years.110  Experts considered the thinness of the polyeth-
ylene tray and the heat-pressure technique of preparation of the polyethylene 
the likely culprits causing early PCA failures.111   
The PCA knee received some products liability attention by courts in the 
1990s.  In 1996, in Haudrich v. Howmedica, Inc.,112 the Supreme Court of Illi-
nois affirmed the lower court’s finding that the cemented PCA knee in the case 
was “unreasonably dangerous.”113  The opinion noted the manufacturer had 
determined that the seven millimeter plastic tray was “too thin” and “eventually 
advised doctors to stop using it.”114  At trial, the plaintiff’s expert witness de-
scribed the manufacturing process such that “the polyethylene was processed 
using heat, which made it susceptible to certain defects like pitting, scratching, 
and ‘delamination,’ whereby the polyethylene breaks apart in layers.”115  The 
manufacturer’s director of sales acknowledged that if the premature failure was 
caused by “contact stresses, the use of heat to process the piece, and inadequate 
polyethylene thickness,” the PCA knee “would be considered unsafe.”116  Ad-
ditionally, in Bendocchi v. Howmedica, Inc.,117 the jury found the manufacturer 
liable for failure to warn about the dangers of the PCA knee.118  Interestingly, 
in the 2014 Mayo Clinic survivorship study,119 the PCA knee was not the worst 
performer; in fact, nine of twenty-two TKAs had worse hazard ratios than the 
PCA knee.120   
Another example of a tibial component with questionable results ap-
proved via the 510(k) pathway is the Miller-Galante knee (“MG1”) knee.121  In 
1986, the MG1 knee was first implanted, and it included a modular tibial com-
ponent with cemented and uncemented porous-coated versions coated with a 
titanium, aluminum, and vanadium alloy with improved biocompatibility pre-
dicted.122  The early results of the MG1 knee caused some researchers to “aban-
don this implant” due to “an unacceptably high rate of complications” within 
two years of follow-up in one study.123   
More recently, metal-on-metal total hip replacements (“MoM”) facili-
tated by 510(k) have received substantial legal attention.  Even though early 
  
 110. Id. at 25.  
 111. Id.    
 112. 662 N.E.2d 1248 (Ill. 1996) 
 113. Id. at 1258.  
 114. Id. at 1253.    
 115. Id. at 1252.    
 116. Id. at 1253.    
 117. 2 F. App’x 711 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 118. Id. at 715.   
 119. See discussion infra Section II.A.3. 
 120. Kremers, supra note 77, at 3 (Table 1).   
 121. 510(k) Premarket Notification, supra note 80. 
 122. Comitini et al., supra note 77, at 109; Amendola et al., supra note 77, at 205. 
 123. C.H. Rorabeck et al., The Miller-Gallante Knee Prosthesis for the Treatment 
of Osteoarthrosis, 75A(3) J. BONE & JOINT SURG. AM. 407 (1993).   
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versions of MoM hips had high revision rates in the 1970–80s,124 MoM hips 
reemerged in the late 1990s, and eventually over one million MoM hip replace-
ments were performed worldwide after 1996.125  In March 2013, scientific stud-
ies revealed more trouble with MoM hips when researchers noted that “metal-
on-metal” total hips had “poor implant survival compared to other options and 
should not be implanted.”126  In February 2016, the FDA reclassified two spe-
cific types of MoM hips as Class III and demanded that PMA applications must 
be filed with the FDA if the “manufacturer wants to continue marketing their 
MoM total hip replacement devices and/or market new MoM total hip replace-
ment devices.”127  MoM hips have gotten substantial legal attention with thou-
sands of lawsuits filed and billions of dollars in settlements already under-
way.128   
Because outlier devices seem to slip through, 510(k) has proven to be a 
poor process to recognize risks associated with apparent minor changes to pred-
icate devices in some significant orthopaedic devices, which has led to allega-
tions of significant injury to many patients.   
3.  Back to the Future:  Orthopaedic Device Predicates Are Often Bet-
ter Than Their 510(k) Descendants 
At least two recent long-term studies suggest that the original all-poly 
tibial TKA designs from the 1980s were likely to last longer than today’s TKA 
designs.  First, in 2014, Mayo Clinic researchers concluded, “the theoretical 
advantages of the metal-backing of the tibial component may not necessarily 
  
 124. Brent M. Ardaugh et al., The 510(k) Ancestry of a Metal-on-Metal Hip Im-
plant, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 97 (Jan. 10, 2013). 
 125. K.J. Bozic et al., The Epidemiology of Bearing Surface Usage in Total Hip 
Arthroplasty in the United States, 91(7) J BONE JOINT SURG AM 1614–1620 (2009); 
Michael Bolognesi & Cameron Ledford, Metal-on-Metal Total Hip Arthroplasty: Pa-
tient Evaluation and Treatment, 23(12) J AMER ACAD ORTHOP SURG 724–731 (Dec. 
2015). 
 126. Alison J. Smith et al., Failure Rates of Stemmed Metal-on-Metal Hip Replace-
ments: Analysis of Data from the National Joint Registry of England and Wales, 
LANCET 1199, 1199 (Mar. 31, 2012) (emphasis added). 
 127. Metal-on-Metal Hip Implants: The FDA’s Activities, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/Im-
plantsandProsthetics/MetalonMetalHipImplants/ucm241769.htm [perma.cc/A6U5-
PAM6] (specifically stating, “all manufacturers of MoM total hip implants are required 
to stop marketing their devices and submit premarket approval applications that must 
be approved before the devices can be marketed.”).  
 128. See, e.g., Jef Feeley, J&J Is Willing to Pay $400 Million-Plus in Hip-Device 
Cases, BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-12/j-j-is-
said-willing-to-pay-400-million-plus-in-hip-device-cases [perma.cc/QB5Y-4D7E] 
(last visited June 22, 2019) (noting one device company is in the process of settling 
“about 3300 of 10,000” lawsuits targeting just one line of its hip replacements). 
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translate into clinical outcomes, and all-polyethylene designs can be success-
fully used in many patients with substantial cost savings.”129  The researchers 
noted, “Our findings strongly suggest that all-polyethylene tibial components 
performed significantly better than the metal-backed modular designs.”130  
Specifically, during the twenty year period from 1985 through 2005, surgeons 
at the Mayo Clinic used forty different types of tibial implants in performing 
17,192 TKAs.131  When they studied the tibial implants, they found that 
“(n)one of the components was associated with a lower risk of revision com-
pared with . . . a component used in the mid-1980s.”132  The researchers re-
ported that the older “all-polyethylene” designs performed “better” than the 
more modern “metal-backed modular tibial designs.”133   
Additionally, other researchers have similarly found better survivorship 
of early designs.  The early non-modular IB1 knees outperformed the more 
modern descendent IB2 in a 2014 study where researchers found that “[a]t 
thirty years, a significant difference existed in the survivorship . . . between the 
non-modular Insall-Burstein I component (92.3%) and the modular Insall-
Burstein II component (68.3%).”134  In other words, only 7.7% of the nonmod-
ular IB1s had to be revised within thirty years, whereas 31.7% of modular IB2s 
were revised within a similar thirty-year period.135  Thus, IB2s were 4.1 times 
more likely to require revision over thirty years.  Multiple other studies have 
likewise revealed that the older and cheaper all-poly design is likely superior 
to the currently prevalent modular designs.136   
The finding that older total knee designs were superior to new knee de-
signs is not unique.  Similar examples include the metal-on-metal total hip re-
placement and changes to the treatment of hip fractures.  A British study of 
400,000 total hip implant patients found a 6.2% failure rate for MoM hips com-
pared to only 1.7% for older traditional total hip devices.137  Another recent 
study suggests that the results of MoM hips appear to be inferior to traditional 
total hips.138   
  
 129. Kremers et al., supra note 73, at 5 (emphasis added).     
 130. Id. (emphasis added). 
 131. Id. at 2.   
 132. Id. at 2–3 (emphasis added).   
 133. Id. at 5. 
 134. Long et al., supra note 88, at e159(1–7).   
 135. Id.  
 136. See e.g., T.J. Gioe et al., Current Concepts Review: The All-Polyethylene Tib-
ial Component in Primary Total Knee Arthroplasty, 92A(2) J. BONE & JOINT SURG. AM. 
478 (2010); T. Cheng et al., Metal-backed versus all-polyethylene tibial components in 
primary total knee arthroplasty, 82(5) ACTA ORTHOP. 589 (2011).    
 137. Smith et al., supra note 126. 
 138. William M. Mihalko et al., How Have Alternative Bearings and Modularity 
Affected Revision Rates in Total Hip Arthroplasty?, 472(12) CLIN. ORTHOP. RELAT. 
RES. 3747–58 (2014).   
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Similarly, a 2008 article authored by the Research Committee (“Commit-
tee”) of the American Board of Orthopaedic Surgeons (“ABOS”)  reported a 
“striking shift” unsupported by scientific findings to a new device (“Nail”) 
from an older proven device (“Plate”) by newly trained orthopaedic surgeons 
fixing hip fractures.139  The Committee found that over a seven year time frame, 
young surgeons went from using the Nail only 3% of the time to fix hip frac-
tures to using the Nail 67% of the time – a “striking” 2,133% increase in market 
share for the Nail in just seven years.140  According to the Committee, the shift 
to the Nail was not based on scientific evidence of improved outcomes for pa-
tients.141  The Committee noted “the only consistent differences found between 
the two fixation techniques seem to be an increased rate of complications (par-
ticularly intraoperative and postoperative fractures) and a higher rate of re-
operation in association with [the Nail].”142  The Committee noted that the 
“consensus from the orthopaedic literature is that [Nail] fixation is associated 
with a higher complication rate and no better outcomes,”143 in addition to 
“higher implant costs and surgeon fees.”144  At least some of the Nail devices 
were approved using 510(k).145   
  
 139. Jeffrey O. Anglen & James N. Weinstein, Nail or Plate Fixation of Intertro-
chanteric Hip Fractures: Changing Pattern of Practice: A Review of the American 
Board of Orthopaedic Surgery Database, 90 J. BONE JOINT & SURGERY AM. 700, 700, 
705 (2008) (noting the newer nail fixation for hip fractures was associated with “in-
creased rate of complications” and “no better outcomes.”  Also noting, “Our data, which 
were collected from young orthopaedic surgeons in the beginning of their careers, con-
firm a higher rate of fracture and procedure-related complications and, at best, equiva-
lent pain and deformity scores at the time of follow-up for patients managed with in-
tramedullary nail fixation.”). 
 140. Id.   
 141. Id. at 706 (noting “higher implant costs and surgeon fees, with no improve-
ment in patient outcomes”). 
 142. Id. at 705 (emphasis added).   
 143. Id. (emphasis added). 
 144. Id.      
 145. See, e.g., U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., 510(k) Premarket Notification, 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfpmn/pmn.cfm?ID=K993670 
[perma.cc/H23E-KQ5S] (last updated June 17, 2019); U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., 
510(k) Premarket Notification, https://www.ac-
cessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfpmn/pmn.cfm?ID=K012158 [perma.cc/9YE3-
PGZ4]; U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., 510(k) Premarket Notification, https://www.ac-
cessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfpmn/pmn.cfm?ID=K020773 [perma.cc/UG6K-
VHMW] (last updated June 17, 2019).  
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B.  Analysis of FDA’s Recent 510(k) Changes on Orthopaedic Device 
Outcomes 
In 2011, the IOM stated that 510(k) was “flawed” and should be replaced 
with an “integrated premarket and postmarket regulatory framework that effec-
tively provides a reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness throughout 
the device life cycle.”146  However, Congress did not replace 510(k).  This Sec-
tion includes an analysis of whether the IOM’s goals were met by reviewing 
the things that have not changed as well as the things that have changed with 
the FDA’s recent 510(k) modifications.   
1.  Things that did not change 
Considering the fact “that <5% of device-related complications were re-
ported to the FDA,”147 the FDA remains bafflingly deferential toward device 
manufacturers.  510(k) remains too deferential for devices implanted within or 
affixed to large bones because (1) it is designed to be the “least burdensome 
approach” for manufacturers instead of the best approach to protect patients, 
(2) a benefit-risk assessment is not required for the majority of devices and 
risks can be “mitigated” with labeling alone, and (3) it has too many excep-
tions.148   
First, an overly deferential framework in favor of manufacturers impedes 
510(k)’s effectiveness because the FDA designs 510(k) “to provide the least 
burdensome approach for manufacturers”; the least burdensome provision says 
that the FDA “shall only request information that is necessary” and “shall con-
sider the least burdensome means of demonstrating substantial equivalence.”149  
This means that for some types of device changes the “Quality System (QS) 
  
 146. IOM REPORT, supra note 11, at 196, 210. 
 147. Day et al., supra note 2, at 522.   
 148. Id.  
 149. Deciding When to Submit a 510(k) for a Change to an Existing Device, U.S. 
FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/downloads/medicaldevices/devicereg-
ulationandguidance/guidancedocuments/ucm514771.pdf [perma.cc/DLC7-LEMC]. 
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regulation” can be relied on as the least burdensome approach without requir-
ing manufacturers to submit a new 510(k).150  The QS regulation basically re-
quires some recordkeeping of the changed device.151  When the QS regulation 
“can reasonably assure the safety and effectiveness of the changed device,” 
submission of a new 510(k) may not be required.152   
In addition, FDA guidance153 explains that reliance on postmarket con-
trols like QS regulations, postmarket surveillance, and medical device report-
ing requirements will be considered as a mechanism “to reduce the extent of 
premarket data for 510(k)s.”154  “In some cases, the FDA may accept greater 
premarket uncertainty regarding a device’s benefit-risk profile through greater 
reliance on postmarket controls, such as postmarket surveillance where appli-
cable, in order to reduce the premarket burden for a 510(k).”155  So, the process 
is tilted heavily in favor of device manufacturer convenience and facilitation 
of change over consumer safety and efficacy requirements.  While postmarket 
surveillance may help identify devices that need to be recalled earlier, it does 
little to protect the consumer from the unsafe device in the first place when it 
has been affixed to or implanted within a large bone.   
Second, according to the FDA, “a benefit-risk assessment is not recom-
mended” or necessary for the majority of 510(k)s to support a determination of 
substantial equivalence.156  Further, “despite differences in the benefit-risk pro-
file, in some circumstances the new device may be determined to be substan-
tially equivalent to the predicate device.”157  In addition, the FDA will consider 
whether “mitigation strategies,” like labeling changes, are adequate to address 
benefit-risk profile differences between the new device and the predicate de-
vice.158   
  
 150. See generally 21 CFR § 820 (2019); U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., 
STATEMENT OF POLICY FOR REGULATING BIOTECHNOLOGY PRODUCTS, GUIDE TO MED. 
DEVICE REG. APP. III (Cum. Supp. Nov. 2018) (hereinafter STATEMENT OF POLICY) 
(noting, “Regardless of whether a change requires premarket review, the QS regulation 
requires manufacturers of finished medical devices to review and approve changes to 
device design and production (21 CFR § 820.30 and § 820.70) and document changes 
and approvals in the device master record (21 CFR § 820.181).  Any process whose 
results cannot be fully verified by subsequent inspection and testing must be validated 
(21 CFR § 820.75), and changes to the process require review, evaluation, and revali-
dation of the process where appropriate (21 CFR § 820.75(c)).”).   
 151. STATEMENT OF POLICY, supra note 150.  
 152. Id.    
 153. The Least Burdensome Provisions: Concepts and Principles, U.S. FOOD AND 
DRUG ADMIN. (Feb. 2019), https://www.fda.gov/media/73188/download 
[perma.cc/446D-SN7Y].  
 154. FDA BENEFIT-RISK FACTORS, supra note 25, at 18. 
 155. Id.   
 156. Id. at 10.      
 157. Id. at 11.      
 158. Id.   
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Finally, a 510(k) is not required to “develop, evaluate, or test a device” – 
including clinical evaluation.159   
For orthopaedic devices, the problem with this deferential approach and 
failure to require a benefit-risk assessment is that seemingly innocuous changes 
(as noted above in some outlier case examples) can lead to unexpected compli-
cations for patients with severe consequences clinically.  Additionally, many 
of these problems require mid- to long-term follow-up of clinical results to pre-
dict.  Further, labeling strategies are of questionable benefit, at best, as dis-
cussed below.   
2.  Things that have changed: Numerous Holes in the November 2018 
Changes 
Unfortunately, the latest updates to 510(k) are unlikely to significantly 
alter the long-term results of orthopaedic devices, unless some additional 
changes are made, as noted below. 
a.  Increased Premarket Expectations for 510(k) Submissions 
As described above, the increased premarket expectations are mostly pa-
perwork requirements that can allow for “paper compliance” without real evi-
dence of clinical safety and efficacy.  The incorporation of risk/benefit factors 
would be helpful if the standards for their use were not so deferential.  As noted 
above, the FDA states that “a benefit-risk assessment is not recommended” or 
necessary for the majority of 510(k)s to support a determination of substantial 
equivalence.160    
One of the risks considered in benefit-risk assessment is the “rate of harm-
ful events.”161  This “refers to the number of harmful events per patient or the 
number of harmful events per unit of time associated with the use of the de-
vice.”162  The FDA considers harmful events, such as (1) “device-related seri-
ous adverse events” like death, life-threatening illness, permanent impairment 
or damage, etc., (2) “device-related non-serious adverse events,” and (3) “pro-
cedure-related complications” like indirect anesthetic complications, etc.163  
The probability of a harmful event reflects “the proportion of the intended pop-
ulation that could be expected to experience a harmful event,” and the “FDA 
  
 159. Premarket Notifications 510(k), U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., 
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/premarket-submissions/premarket-notification-
510k [perma.cc/YU8J-2YWA] (noting “Please note that if you perform clinical trials 
with your device, you are subject to the Investigational Device Exemption (IDE) regu-
lation (21 CFR § 812).”).   
 160. FDA BENEFIT-RISK FACTORS, supra note 25, at 10.      
 161. Id. at 14.  
 162. Id.    
 163. Id.  
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could factor whether an event occurs once or repeatedly into the measurement 
of probability.” 164    
The FDA needs to reconsider its benefit-risk assessment rules for devices 
affixed to or implanted within large bones when there is already a predicate 
device with good to excellent outcomes.  The FDA should also emphasize sta-
tistical risk of unnecessary morbidity and mortality when similar devices are 
already on the market to treat the specific orthopaedic malady.  A closer look 
at the clinical outcomes with regard to morbidity and mortality likely reflected 
by the studies of all-poly versus modular metal-backed tibial TKA components 
helps explain why the FDA should be less deferential with devices like TKAs 
when it comes to benefit-risk assessment.  Evolution of the TKA tibial compo-
nent to today’s less durable and more expensive modular design facilitated by 
510(k) has likely resulted in significant morbidity, mortality, and financial 
costs with questionable resultant benefit at best.165  As calculated in the follow-
ing paragraphs, almost 8,700 people likely have died or will die as a result of 
revision surgeries related to the change from all-poly to modular metal-backed 
TKAs, and many more have suffered unnecessary morbidity.166   
Quantitatively, Mayo Clinic researchers in 2014 discovered that the all-
poly knees had a hazard ratio of 0.3 compared to modular knees – meaning that 
the all-poly knees were 0.3 times as likely to undergo a revision compared to 
the newer modular designs.167  In a separate study, Kaiser-Permanente re-
searchers likewise found a hazard ratio of 0.3 for all-poly tibial implants com-
pared to modular metal-backed designs.168  Using the hazard ratio of 0.3 for 
all-poly knees versus modular knees from the Mayo and Kaiser studies and 
using established TKA volume data, it is easy to roughly estimate the past and 
future costs of the changes to tibial design since 1990 – including morbidity, 
mortality, and financial costs.   
In the twenty-seven years between 1990 and 2017, around 13,438,238 
TKAs were performed in the U.S.169  Using current techniques, the lifetime 
risk of revision surgery for someone with a TKA is 16.5%.170  In the Mayo 
  
 164. Id. at 15.       
 165. Id.  
 166. Id.  
 167. Kremers et al., supra note 73, at 1 (stating, “In comparison with metal-backed 
modular implants, all-polyethylene tibial components had a significantly lower risk of 
revision (hazard ratio, 0.3; 95% confidence intervals: 0.2, 0.5 [p < 0.0001]).”).   
 168. Vivek Mohan et al., Monoblock All-Polyethylene Tibial Components Have a 
Lower Risk of Early Revision than Metal-Backed Modular Components, 84(6) ACTA 
ORTHOPAEDICA 530, 530 (2013) (reporting results of a “[r]egistry study of 27,657 pri-
mary total knee arthroplasties”). 
 169. See infra App. A.   
 170. Alexander M. Weinstein et al., Estimating the Burden of Total Knee Replace-
ment in the United States, 95 J. BONE & JOINT SURG. AM. 385, 390 (2013) (quoting a 
rate of 14.9% for males and 17.4% for females; since 2/3 of primary TKAs involve 
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Clinic study, about 80% of the knees used were modular designs; so, if 80% of 
knees implanted during that time period were modular, then around 10,750,590 
modular tibias were implanted from 1990 through 2016.171  So, if 16.5% of 
those 10.75 million modular tibias needed revision surgery, then 1,773,847 
people underwent (or will undergo during the life of the implant) revision sur-
gery.  If those 1,773,847 people had all-poly tibias, only 532,154 of them would 
have to undergo revision surgery since the hazard ratio is 0.3 for the all poly 
tibia compared to the modular tibia.  Therefore, there will be a total of around 
1,241,693172 people who must undergo a revision total knee surgery that theo-
retically would not have been necessary if the original design had not been 
changed; hereinafter, I will refer to these as “avoidable revisions.”   
The risk of perioperative death for revision TKA is around 0.7%.173  If 
0.7% of those 1,241,693 people undergoing avoidable revision TKA surgery 
die, then 8,692 people174 have died or will die unnecessarily as a result of mod-
ular total knees performed from 1990 through 2017.  In addition, some people 
have experienced or will experience avoidable, nonfatal, and costly life-alter-
ing complications related to those 1,241,693 avoidable revisions – estimated at 
approximately 12,417 deep infections (1%),175 7,823 symptomatic deep venous 
thromboses (DVT; i.e., blood clots; 0.63% rate),176 and 3,353 pulmonary em-
boli (0.27%).177 
In addition, these 1,241,693 avoidable revision surgeries carry consider-
able financial costs.  In 2016 dollars, each revision surgery costs around 
$70,000 on average.178  Therefore, 1.242 million avoidable revisions from 1990 
  
females, the gender adjusted risk is 16.5% for the entire population—mathematically, 
(2/3 x 17.4 ) + (1/3 x 14.9) = 16.5).   
 171. Kremers et al., supra note 73, at 3 (stating, “Metal-backed modular tibial com-
ponents constituted almost 80% of the tibial designs used in this cohort.”).   
 172. 1,773,847 minus 532,154 people.  
 173. Thomas Fehring et al., Mortality Following Revision Joint Arthroplasty: Is age 
a factor?, 24 J. ARTHROPLASTY e85 (2010) (0.2% in patients <70 years old; 0.8% in 70 
to 79; and 2.63% in >80 years old). 
 174. 0.007 x 1,241,693 million = 8,692. 
 175. Joint Replacement Infection, AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ORTHOPAEDIC 
SURGEONS, http://orthoinfo.aaos.org/topic.cfm?topic=A00629 [perma.cc/QG6D-
JYPA] (last visited June 22, 2019) (quoting 1% infection rate for TKA).   
 176. Gregory M. Martin et al., Complications of Total Knee Arthroplasty, 
UPTODATE, http://www.uptodate.com/contents/complications-of-total-knee-arthro-
plasty [perma.cc/QYV5-AUM5] (reporting symptomatic DVT rate of 0.63% and PE 
rate of 0.27%); Jean-Marie Januel et al., Symptomatic In-Hospital Deep Vein Throm-
bosis and Pulmonary Embolism Following Hip and Knee Arthroplasty Among Patients 
Receiving Recommended Prophylaxis, 307(3) J. AMER. MED. ASSN. 294–303 (2012).    
 177. Martin et. al., supra note 176.      
 178. TKA prices are difficult to project because of wide variations between hospi-
tals and suppliers.  $70,000 is based upon the average of two studies and conversion to 
2016 dollars.  M. Bhandari et al., Clinical and Economic Burden of Revision Knee Ar-
throplasty, 5 CLIN. MED. INSIGHTS ARTHRITIS MUSCULOSKEL. DISORD. 89–94 (2013) 
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through 2017 added or will add $86.9 billion in avoidable expense to the 
healthcare system.179  Additionally, modular knees cost an average of $957 
more per implant;180  if the 10.75 million people had received all-poly knees 
instead of modular knees, then an additional $10.3 billion would have been 
saved.181  Thus, from higher implant costs and unnecessary revisions alone, 
$97.2 billion has been or will be unnecessarily spent on the modular knees per-
formed from 1990 through 2017.  This cost estimate is likely very conservative 
because it does not include the morbidity costs associated with complications, 
such as infection, DVT, PE, and other complications.  Likewise, outlier im-
plants with higher complication rates are not included.       
Convincing evidence is lacking that 510(k) makes up for the losses sus-
tained in TKAs with advances in other orthopaedic devices.  Similar profiles 
to the TKA tibial component outlined above could potentially be exposed with 
regard to the other components of total knee replacement, to total hip replace-
ments, to hip fracture treatment, and to other orthopaedic devices once more 
specific data similar to the Mayo study is produced – as there is little evidence 
that some of these components are better today than they were in the mid 
  
(reporting $49,000 in 2012 dollars and adjusted to $51,510 in 2016 dollars using 
http://www.usinflationcalculator.com); Carlos Lavernia et al., The Increasing Finan-
cial Burden of Knee Revision Surgery in the United States, 446 CLIN. ORTHOP. 221–26 
(2006) (reporting $73,696 in 2006 dollars and adjusted to $88,228 in 2016 dollars using 
http://www.usinflationcalculator.com).   
 179. $70,000 per revision x 1.242 million avoidable revisions.   
 180. Gioe et al., supra note 136, at 478.   
 181. $957 x 10.75 million. 
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1980s.182  Several devices seem likely to have worse cost profiles than the mod-
ular, metal backed tibial component,183 and significant, proven device innova-
tions to offset those costs are not readily and convincingly apparent.  The con-
sistent change with new devices is higher prices,184 not better outcomes for 
patients.  
Because well-established, safe, and effective devices are already on the 
market for many orthopaedic devices, benefit-risk analysis should take into ac-
count these types of calculations in order to avoid unnecessary morbidity, mor-
tality, and financial costs associated with 510(k).   
“When reviewing a new device and assessing different technological 
characteristics in accordance with this guidance, [the] FDA may consider post-
market data (e.g., literature, recalls, registry data, medical device reports) col-
lected on marketed devices of the same type.” 185  The FDA should consider 
the types of calculations above before clearing 510(k) orthopaedic devices that 
are meant to treat orthopaedic maladies that already have treatments with ex-
cellent long-term outcomes.   
  
 182. The tibial component of total knees simply now has a few studies that have 
produced specific hazard ratios to allow some simple computations; hopefully, similar 
studies will be done for other orthopaedic implants in the future. Information Statement: 
Current Concerns with Metal-on-Metal Hip Arthroplasty, AM. ACAD. OF ORTHOPAEDIC 
SURGEONS 1 (2012), https://www.aaos.org/uploadedFiles/PreProduction/About/Opin-
ion_Statements/advistmt/1035%20Current%20Concerns%20with%20Metal-on-
Metal%20Hip%20Arthroplasty.pdf [perma.cc/M8K2-R757] [hereinafter AAOS 
INFORMATION STATEMENT]; Michael P. Bolognesi et al., Metal-on-Metal Total Hip Ar-
throplasty: Patient Evaluation and Treatment, 23 J. AM. ACAD. ORTHOPAEDIC 
SURGERY 724, 724–25, 730 (2015) (noting issues with new metal-on-metal total hip 
replacements compared to older designs); Kevin J. Bozic et al., The Epidemiology of 
Bearing Surface Usage in Total Hip Arthroplasty in the United States, 91 J. BONE & 
JOINT SURG. AM. 1614 (2009); Effectiveness of Metal-on-Metal Hip Implants, U.S. 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/metal-metal-hip-im-
plants/effectiveness-metal-metal-hip-implants [perma.cc/RG4W-5WCM] (last updated 
Mar. 14, 2016) (noting issues with new metal-on-metal hip replacements compared to 
older designs); Anglen & Weinstein, supra note 139, at 705 (noting that the newer nail 
fixation for hip fractures was associated with “increased rate of complications” and “no 
better outcomes”); Wade R. Smith et al., Locking Plates: Tips and Tricks, 89 J. BONE 
& JOINT SURG. AM. 2298, 2303, 2306 (2007) (noting claims of increased healing rates 
with newer locking plates compared to older non-locking plates had “not been validated 
in any type of controlled trial” and that “few series had validated the long-term ad-
vantages of fixation with locking plates”); James C. Bailey et al., Failure of the metal 
backed patellar component after total knee replacement, 70 J. BONE & JOINT SURG. 
AM. 668 (1988) (noting problems with newer metal-backed patellar components com-
pared to older all-poly patellar components). 
 183. Bailey et al., supra note 182, at 668.  
 184. Kayode O. Oduwole et al., Increasing financial burden of revision total knee 
arthroplasty, 18 KNEE SURG SPORTS TRAUMATOL ARTHROSC. 945, 945–48 (2010). 
 185. FDA BENEFIT-RISK FACTORS, supra note 25, at 18.       
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b.  Refuse-To-Accept Policy 
The “Refuse-to-Accept” policy is basically a checklist that is used to 
make sure applications are complete before the FDA deploys additional re-
sources to analyze the proposed 510(k) device.186  In the sense that this makes 
the FDA more efficient and preserves time and resources for complete appli-
cations, the policy could help with orthopaedic device approval because re-
sources may be better spent and used more efficiently.187  However, since this 
is again a regulatory policy focused on paper compliance and not a substantive 
review, the effect on outcomes of the devices themselves is likely to be mini-
mal.188  This bureaucratic requirement merely ensures that the FDA only re-
views complete applications, improving the efficiency of the FDA, but other-
wise does not affect quality or long term performance evaluation. 
c.  Improved Consistency and Thoroughness 
The 510(k) SMART memo template now used by FDA reviewers pro-
vides guidance that should meet the goal of improving consistency and thor-
oughness in evaluating the paper compliance of 510(k) applications.189  The 
links provided by the template should facilitate more consistent analysis and 
help with documentation of pertinent information.190  Likewise, the frequent 
updates will help facilitate consistency and help to make important information 
available to FDA reviewers.191  FDA reviewers spend more time on each 
510(k) application in part because of this program.192  However, this tool 
mainly ensures that applicants follow checklists and that information is avail-
able, but it does not place any specific additional substantive requirements on 
device manufacturers to ensure clinical safety and efficacy.193  It is hard to see 
how this will improve the ultimate outcome of orthopaedic devices like those 
mentioned earlier in this paper. 
  
 186. FDA Steps to Strengthen 510(k), supra note 8, at 5.   
 187. Id.   
 188. FDA Refuse to Accept Policy, supra note 29, at 4 (explaining that this policy 
only assesses completeness of the application, not quality or substance).   
 189. FDA Steps to Strengthen 510(k), supra note 8, at 6.   
 190. Id.   
 191. Id.   
 192. Id. (noting that the FDA’s staff now spend more time reviewing each 510(k) 
submission “than ever before.”  The FDA estimates that its reviewers now spend twice 
as much time reviewing each 510(k) as they did just 15 years ago and 32% more time 
than they did in 2009).   
 193. Id.  
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d.  Elimination of 510(k) for Class III Devices 
Elimination of 510(k) for Class III devices is a major step in the right 
direction and would make a tremendous difference if more orthopaedic devices 
were classified as Class III.  However, a surprising number of orthopaedic de-
vices that require very invasive surgery to be affixed or implanted within large 
human bones deep within the body are still considered Class II, even though 
they are associated with major potential complications up to and including 
death.194  In fact, from 1992 to 2012, “94% of orthopaedic devices were cate-
gorized as class II” even though many were affixed permanently to large, deep 
bones, and “during that same time period, orthopaedic devices were approxi-
mately thirteen times more likely to be cleared through the 510(k) process ra-
ther than the PMA process.”195  
Examples of orthopaedic devices affixed to or implanted within large 
bones still classified as Class II include: (1) bone fixation cerclage,196 (2) in-
tramedullary fixation rods,197 (3) single/multiple component metallic bone fix-
ation appliances and accessories,198 (4) smooth or threaded metallic bone fixa-
tion fastener,199 (5) most primary total hip replacement configurations,200 and 
(6) most primary total knee replacement configurations.201  
All of these devices can require deep dissection (to the bone) in the human 
body and can be associated with major complications ranging from pulmonary 
embolism to permanent disability to death.  When modifications go bad, the 
results can devastate patients’ lives.  For example, until May 2016, these metal 
on metal total hips with alleged major complications and multiple lawsuits 
were Class II.202   
For the majority of orthopaedic devices, which are still Class II, this 
change will have minimal effect.   
  
 194. Day et al., supra note 2, at 522 (noting that “many high-risk implantable or-
thopaedic devices are miscategorized under class II and thus do not undergo PMA re-
view”) (internal citations omitted). 
 195. Id.    
 196. 21 C.F.R. § 888.3010 (2019). 
 197. § 888.3020. 
 198. § 888.3030. 
 199. § 888.3040. 
 200. §§ 888.3310, 888.3340, 888.3350, 888.3353, 888.3358, 888.3360. 
 201. §§ 888.3500, 888.3510, 888.3520, 888.3530, 888.3535, 888.3540, 888.3560, 
888.3565, 888.3590.   
 202. Metal-on-Metal Hip Implants: The FDA’s Activities, supra note 127 (specifi-
cally stating, “there is insufficient evidence and information to conclude that general 
controls in combination with special controls would provide reasonable assurance of 
the safety and effectiveness of these devices.”).   
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e.  Elimination of More Than 1000 Devices as Legal Predicates 
If elimination of predicates is based upon outcome studies that demon-
strate the eliminated devices have questionable patient outcomes, then predi-
cate elimination could be an important step.  Clearly, “the unknown risks that 
. . . devices pose when they are cleared with inadequate predicates is a burden 
that patients should not have to bear.” 203   
Elimination of questionable predicates helps address “predicate creep.”204  
Predicate creep is a 510(k) progression in which each generation of a new de-
vice evolves farther from any device that has been proven safe and effective 
with clinical data because once the FDA clears a device by 510(k) or PMA it 
can be used as a legal predicate.205  The cumulative design changes associated 
with predicate creep can lead to devices with little resemblance to the original 
predicate in a long “predicate chain,” which means the approved device is 
likely only as safe and effective as the weakest link in the chain.206  
However, the FDA should base elimination of predicates on clinical re-
sults regarding safety and efficacy (including those available in postmarket sur-
veillance and in registry studies) and not on the age of the predicate.  In some 
cases, eliminating older devices as predicates could lead to worse devices 
where some older devices have proven safer and more effective than their de-
scendants, as noted above in the Mayo Clinic and Kaiser-Permanente studies 
of total knees.207  Therefore, the predicate’s age should not be the main factor 
(or necessarily even a factor) in determining whether the predicate can still be 
used. 
Unfortunately, the FDA focuses on eliminating predicates that are over 
ten years old based upon a recent call for public comment.208  The FDA be-
lieves “[t]he most impactful way that we can promote innovation and improved 
  
 203. Arianne Freeman, Predicate Creep: The Danger of Multiple Predicate De-
vices, 23 ANNALS HEALTH L. ADVANCE DIRECTIVE 127, 139 (2014).  (“The unknown 
risks that Class III devices pose when they are cleared with inadequate predicates is an 
unethical burden that patients should not have to bear.”). 
 204. Id. at 127–28.  
 205. Id. at 128; Fargen et al., supra note 4, at 272, 275 n.27. (explaining that once 
the FDA clears a device via 510(k) or PMA, it can be used as a predicate for future 
devices without new safety or efficacy proof). 
 206. Frank M. Griffin, Prejudicial Interpretation of Expert Reliability on the Cut-
ting Edge Enables the Orthopaedic Implant Industry’s Bodily Eminent Domain Claim, 
18 MINN. J. L. SCI. TECH. 207, 220 (2017).  
 207. Mohan et al., supra note 168, at 535. 
 208. Statement from FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D. and Jeff Shuren, 
M.D., Director of the Center for Devices and Radiological Health, on Transformative 
New Steps to Modernize FDA’s 510(k) Program to Advance the Review of the Safety 
and Effectiveness of Medical Devices, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. (November 26, 
2018),  
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safety in the 510(k) program is to drive innovators toward reliance on more 
modern predicate devices or objective performance criteria when they seek to 
bring new devices to patients.209  The FDA is “looking at ways to promote the 
use of more recent predicates.”210  To meet this goal, “in the next few months 
CDRH is considering making public on its website those cleared devices that 
demonstrated substantial equivalence to . . . predicates that are more than 10 
years old.”211   
In orthopaedics, this could foreseeably lead to a worsening of the design 
pool of predicates and weaken the safety and efficacy of new orthopaedic de-
vices.  While this change would be beneficial if newer devices performed bet-
ter, recent studies noted above suggest the exact opposite is true in many 
cases.212  Focusing on new predicates may even worsen the problem of “pred-
icate creep” noted above as devices get farther and farther away from any de-
vice with long term follow-up studies or registry data.   
IV.  ADDITIONAL PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
Additional potential solutions to improve outcomes of orthopaedic de-
vices approved by the FDA include (A) regulatory changes by the FDA, (B) 
ensuring fairness in medical device products liability litigation, and (C) con-
gressional action.    
A.  Regulatory Changes by the FDA 
In addition to the changes noted above related to the FDA’s recent guid-
ance, the FDA could potentially improve the results of orthopaedic device 
modifications by reclassifying all implants affixed to or implanted within long 
bones (e.g., the femur) as Class III devices.   
Class III devices are those that “either ‘presen[t] a potential unreasonable 
risk of illness or injury,’ or which are ‘purported or represented to be for a use 
. . . which is of substantial importance in preventing impairment of human 
health.’”213  The FDA subjects Class III devices to § 360e – the PMA process 
– to “provide reasonable assurance of [their] safety and effectiveness.”214    
For orthopaedic devices, the 11.5 times higher recall rate for 510(k) de-




H2R7].   
 209. Id.  
 210. Id.     
 211. Id.     
 212. Freeman, supra note 203, at 132.   
 213. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 477 (1996) (citing 21 U.S.C § 
360c(a)(1)(C) (1992)); 21 U.S.C. § 360c (2012). 
 214. 21 U.S.C. § 360c (2012). 
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or injury” because many of those recalled devices will require revision surgery 
bearing a significant and unnecessary risk of injury.215  If those orthopaedic 
devices were simply reclassified to Class III, then the recall rate would drop by 
a factor of 11.5.  In addition, when devices are available with proven long his-
tories of safety and efficacy, modifications to those designs present “potential 
unreasonable risk of illness of injury” by outlier implants as described above.216  
Reclassification as Class III may have prevented some outlier devices from 
reaching a larger market where clinical data is required on the front end, and 
complications are avoided by restricting dispersion of the outlier device with-
out more safety and efficacy data.  Further, when new devices underperform 
their predicates, the avoidable revisions and resultant morbidity and mortality 
also represent an “unreasonable risk of injury or illness” – demonstrated by the 
likely almost 8700 deaths discussed above related to changes in the tibial com-
ponent of TKAs alone.217  If total knee replacements218 were simply reclassi-
fied as Class III, many of those deaths could likely have been avoided because 
clinical data would have been required that may have beneficially throttled the 
speed of the “TKA races.”    
Total hips219 should also be moved to Class III for similar reasons.  In 
addition, the FDA should move orthopaedic plates and screws220 to Class III 
because there are similar long-term proven devices and because risks of these 
devices include complications like (1) plate or screw breakage or bending lead-
ing to revision surgery and its attendant risks of morbidity and mortality, and 
(2) protruding screw tips injuring nerves (causing nerve damage), arteries 
(causing bleeding), and other soft tissues.221  Similarly, intramedullary nails222 
carry a risk of fat or air embolism, mechanical failure or breakage, penetration 
of bones and joints, becoming stuck inside the bone, and other issues that can 
result in serious morbidity and mortality.223  510(k) alone fails to adequately 
assess the safety and efficacy of modifications of current proven designs of 
  
 215. Day et al., supra note 2, at 522. 
 216. See discussion supra Section II.A.2. 
 217. See discussion supra Section II.B.2.   
 218. 21 C.F.R. §§ 888.3500, 888.3510, 888.3520, 888.3530, 888.3535, 888.3540, 
888.3560, 888.3565, 888.3590 (2019).   
 219. §§ 888.3310, 888.3340, 888.3350, 888.3353, 888.3358, 888.3360; Day, supra 
note 2, at 522 (noting “only 15% of 510(k)-cleared total hip replacement devices had 
published data on clinical effectiveness”). 
 220. § 888.3030. 
 221. Jason A. Lowe, Internal Fixation for Fractures, ORTHOINFO (April 2019), 
https://orthoinfo.aaos.org/en/treatment/internal-fixation-for-fractures/ 
[perma.cc/7BNU-DPEJ]; 
(noting plates may break); John E. Lonstein et al., Complications Associated with Ped-
icle Screws, 81 J. BONE JOINT SURG. 1519, 1519 (1999). 
 222. § 888.3020. 
 223. Duke Orthopaedics, Complications of Femoral IM Nailing, WHEELESS 
TEXTBOOK OF ORTHOPAEDICS, http://www.wheelessonline.com/ortho/complica-
tions_of_femoral_im_nailing [perma.cc/7WH9-N2BJ].  
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devices affixed to or implanted within large bones without significant clinical 
data like that required by PMA.   
B.  Ensuring Fairness in Medical Device-Related Trials 
Courts can improve orthopaedic recall and complication rates (1) by giv-
ing plaintiffs a voice and listening to arguments for liability against manufac-
turers (and possibly surgeons) under informed consent law and (2) by ensuring 
the plaintiffs have a fair chance to prove design defect by fairly analyzing ex-
pert witnesses under Daubert.  
1.  State Tort Law: Informed Consent 
The FDA often cites labeling as a method of “risk mitigation” in benefit 
risk assessment of new devices with the FDA noting that “[e]ven if a new de-
vice has an increased risk and if the risk is appropriately mitigated, FDA may 
determine that the new device has a comparable benefit-risk profile to the pred-
icate device and therefore determine that the new device is ‘as safe and effec-
tive’ as the predicate device.”224  The FDA added, “The most common form of 
risk mitigation is to include appropriate information within labeling (e.g., 
warnings, precautions, contraindications).”225  Further, the FDA stated, “Some 
risks can be mitigated through other forms of risk communication, including 
training and professional and patient labeling.”226    
The FDA’s reliance on warning labels to mitigate risk is ineffective if 
surgeons and patients are not aware of the warnings.  In my experience, FDA 
clearance information, device labels, and recall rates are rarely included in in-
formed consent discussions regarding orthopaedic device implantations; often 
the surgeon has not even seen the label.  In addition, surgeons and patients 
likely rarely understand the significance of 510(k) versus PMA clearance when 
it comes to orthopaedic devices and rarely are aware which pathway a particu-
lar device took to clearance.227  Therefore, courts should hold manufacturers 
and surgeons responsible for educating patients regarding the risks involved 
with 510(k) clearance of orthopaedic devices during the informed consent pro-
cess; allowing patients and surgeons to become more aware of these issues and 
take them into account when choosing treatments would be a more “patient-
centered” and “patient-driven” approach.   
  
 224. FDA BENEFIT-RISK FACTORS, supra note 25, at 17–18.     
 225. Id. at 18 (emphasis added).   
 226. Id.   
 227. Day et al., supra note 2, at 517. 
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If the manufacturer properly educates the surgeon228 about the risks asso-
ciated with its device (e.g., through effective warnings included in sales dis-
cussions), then the duty will fall upon the surgeon under the learned interme-
diary doctrine to properly inform the patient.229  When surgeons are unaware, 
they cannot function as effective learned intermediaries.230  In those instances, 
liability should remain with the manufacturer with regard to educating sur-
geons and patients.  In order to avoid liability, the manufacturer should have to 
transparently inform the surgeon of the data and FDA clearance pathway by 
which the device reached the market (especially in orthopaedics where FDA 
clearance pathway changes the recall risk by a factor of 11.5); in addition, man-
ufacturers should be held liable where salesmanship dupes the surgeon into 
believing the device stands on more solid scientific grounds than reality.231   
Under informed consent doctrine, patient and physician notification of 
orthopaedic device clearance pathway should be required because the much 
higher recall rate of 510(k) orthopaedic devices makes the information material 
to the patient’s decision to consent to the implantation of, and the surgeon’s 
decision to use, the particular device.232   
Informed consent “requires a physician to warn a patient of the risks and 
consequences of a medical procedure.”233  This should include a fundamental 
duty to warn patients of the risks and consequences of a procedure involving 
an evolving medical device like a 510(k) device.234  Many regard the patient’s 
right to participate in decision-making as one of the patient’s “most fundamen-
tal rights.”235  Informed consent fosters personal autonomy and doctor-patient 
  
 228. Id. (noting the clinical relevance of 510(k) information and saying, “When or-
thopaedic surgeons are considering using a new device clinically in their patients, it is 
important for them to consider how the new device was approved by the FDA.  If the 
device was approved by the 510(k) pathway, then it may have been approved without 
additional clinical studies confirming efficacy or safety.”). 
 229. Frank M. Griffin, The Trouble with the Curve: Manufacturer and Surgeon Li-
ability for “Learning Curves” Associated with Unreliably-Screened Implantable Med-
ical Devices, 69 ARK. L. REV. 755, 773–74 (2016); Diane Schmauder Kane, Annota-
tion, Construction and Application of Learned-Intermediary Doctrine, 57 A.L.R.5th 1, 
§2[a] (1998) (explaining that in many jurisdictions under the learned intermediary doc-
trine, the manufacturer cannot be held liable for failing to directly warn the consumer 
as long as the consumer’s doctor, acting as a learned intermediary, was given adequate 
warnings of the device’s inherent dangers).   
 230. See Kowalski v. Rose Drugs of Dardanelle, Inc., 378 S.W.3d 109, 120 (Ark. 
2011) (stating physicians are in the best position to inform patients of risks of treat-
ment); Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919, 922 (8th Cir. 1970). 
 231. Kane, supra note 229, at 34–35; Schenebeck, 423 F.2d at 922. 
 232. Day et al., supra note 2, at 522. 
 233. Lucas v. Awaad, 830 N.W.2d 141, 150 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Wlosin-
ski v. Cohn, 713 N.W.2d 16, 20 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005)) (emphasis added). 
 234. Id. at 150–51.   
 235. Y. Longtin et al., Patient Participation: Current Knowledge and Applicability 
to Patient Safety, 85 MAYO CLINICAL PROC. 53, 54 (2010).  
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communication; informed consent also allows patients to improve quality of 
care where they understand the procedures that they undergo and can provide 
feedback to the healthcare system.236  Informed consent is also important be-
cause it involves the public in medical decision-making, adding a layer of trans-
parency to surgical decision-making.237   
The Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) emphasizes “preference sensitive 
care,” 238  which is defined as  
[M]edical care for which the clinical evidence does not clearly support 
one treatment option such that the appropriate course of treatment de-
pends on the values . . . and preferences of the patient . . .  regarding the 
benefits, harms and scientific evidence for each treatment option, the 
use of such care should depend on the informed patient choice among 
clinically appropriate treatment options.239 
Thus, the ACA advocates allowing the patient to hear about “each treat-
ment option” and to use his or her own “values and preferences” in the deci-
sion-making process.240  In order for this to happen, surgeons or manufacturers 
must educate patients regarding the recall risks and other risks (noted above) 
associated with orthopaedic 510(k) devices.  The ACA requirements may be 
used as evidence in matters of state informed consent law.   
Ultimately, the surgeon’s duty to warn of particular dangers is typically a 
question to be submitted to the jury.241  Generally, a jury decides exactly how 
much information should be disclosed to the patient.242  Courts commonly 
adopt a rule that any “material risk” must be disclosed.243  “A material risk is a 
risk which a reasonable person would consider significant in deciding whether 
  
 236. Alexander M. Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research 
and Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 340, 365–376 (1974); Longtin et al., supra note 235, 
at 53–54.   
 237. Capron, supra note 236, at 376. 
 238. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 936, 42 U.S.C. §§ 299b-36(b)(2), 
(d)(1)(A) (2012). 
 239. §§ 299b-36(b)(2). 
 240. Id. 
 241. Mitchell v. Robinson, 334 S.W.2d 11, 16 (Mo. 1960). 
 242. Id.   
 243. See, e.g., Hill v. Medlantic Health Care Grp., 933 A.2d 314, 329–30 (D.C. Cir. 
2007); Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 161 (3d Cir. 2000); Hahn v. Mirda, 
54 Cal. Rptr. 3d 527, 532 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007); DeGennaro v. Tandon, 873 A.2d 191, 
196 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005); Heinrich ex rel. Heinrich v. Sweet, 118 F. Supp. 2d 73, 81 
(D. Mass. 2000), vacated sub nom Heinrich v. Sweet 308 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 2002); Can-
terbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786–88 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Mitchell, 334 S.W.3d at 16–
17.   
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to undergo a particular medical treatment.”244  Given the 11.5 times higher re-
call rate of 510(k) orthopaedic devices,245 many juries might decide that pa-
tients have a right to know when a device has been cleared by the riskier 510(k) 
pathway in orthopaedic implant cases.  An 11.5 times higher recall rate is likely 
“material” to many patients in deciding to undergo a major orthopaedic proce-
dure in which a device is affixed permanently to a large bone. Risks of 510(k) 
devices should become part of the standard of care for informed consent dis-
closure to patients, so that patients and the public can have a say in which de-
vices become mainstream.246   
Second, many courts require surgeons to disclose reasonable alternative 
treatment options.247  One court ruled that “where a physician or surgeon can 
ascertain in advance of an operation, alternative situations and no immediate 
emergency exists, a patient should be informed of the alternative possibilities 
and given a chance to decide before the doctor proceeds with the operation.”248  
Where established orthopaedic devices with proven track records are available 
or where PMA devices are available, the surgeon should be obliged to disclose 
these facts to obtain informed consent due to the huge difference in recall rates 
and potential consequences related to use of the comparatively unproven de-
vice or the 510(k) device.  As noted above, new implants often carry a risk of 
death or disability statistically associated with avoidable revisions, and risks of 
death or serious injury should always be disclosed under informed consent doc-
trine.249     
Requiring surgeons to disclose 510(k) status and corresponding orthopae-
dic statistics gives patients a much-needed voice in these important decisions.  
Patients may cast their 510(k) vote financially for safer and more proven de-
vices if they are given the opportunity to actively participate in the process.   
2.  Ensuring a Fair Trial under Daubert in Medical Device Cases 
Harmed patients deserve a voice on the issue of 510(k) devices that lead 
to avoidable complications, and courts are often in the best position to provide 
that voice.  Courts should become less deferential to insider medical experts 
and more diligent in recognizing the conflicts of interest (e.g., being on the 
  
 244. Hill, 933 A.2d at 330.  
 245. Day et al., supra note 2, at 517. 
 246. Griffin, supra note 206, at 755. 
 247. See, e.g., Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 781; Sweet v. Sisters of Providence in 
Wash., 895 P.2d 484, 493 (Alaska 1995); Miller v. Van Newkirk, 628 P.2d 143, 146 
(Colo. App. 1980); Ray ex rel. Ray v. Kapiolani Med. Specialists, 259 P.3d 569, 582 
(Haw. 2011); Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., 88 N.W.2d 186, 190 (Minn. 1958); 
Stanley v. Chevathanarat, 664 S.E.2d 146, 149 (W. Va. 2008). 
 248. Bang, 88 N.W.2d at 190.   
 249. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 787–78; Kapiolani Med. Specialists, 259 P.3d at 584; 
Mitchell v. Robinson, 334 S.W.2d 11, 19 (Mo. 1960) (noting the physician must warn 
of “possible serious collateral hazards”). 
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company’s payroll, owning stock in the company, or receiving royalties on 
sales of the device) that taint their opinions.250  Courts should realize that they 
are often the last and best protection between patients and dangerous medical 
devices, and that “the unknown risks that . . . devices pose when they are 
cleared with inadequate predicates is a burden that patients should not have to 
bear.”251  In addition, courts should stop shifting the blame for poor device 
performance onto doctors and hospitals; preferential laws toward implant com-
panies encourage lawyers to go after doctors and hospitals, driving up the cost 
of medical malpractice in the healthcare market.252  Finally, courts should de-
mand that patients be informed of the dangers of unproven medical devices as 
part of informed consent doctrine to improve transparency for patients in the 
decision-making process.    
a.  A Balanced Approach to Expert Testimony: Stop Favoring Insider De-
fendants’ Experts with Conflicts of Interest and Disfavoring Plaintiffs’ Ex-
perts  
First, courts should be more critical in pre-trial Daubert rulings of insider 
medical experts who will testify at trial.253  Courts have a tendency in their 
Daubert rulings to favor industry experts and disfavor plaintiffs’ experts.254  
One court stated, “Law lags science; it does not lead it.”255  However, courts 
can distinguish insider bias and self-interest marketing from valid independent 
scientific expert opinion testimony.256  Courts can look to author disclosure 
statements in the orthopaedic literature as one source for evidence of conflicts 
of interest, which orthopaedic publishers consider very important (with good 
reason).257  Some paid orthopaedic implant consultant surgeons make millions 
of dollars from their consulting agreements, royalties on devices, or other ar-
rangements.258  One study found that insider surgeons report almost exclusively 
positive outcomes with the devices in which they are personally invested – in-
  
 250. Griffin, supra note 206, at 271 (noting, “A close look at some recent orthopae-
dic design cases supports the idea that judges are being too deferential in admitting 
defense experts while being overzealous in excluding plaintiffs’ experts.”).   
 251. Freeman, supra note 203, at 139 (“The unknown risks that Class III devices 
pose when they are cleared with inadequate predicates is an unethical burden that pa-
tients should not have to bear.”). 
 252. Griffin, supra note 206, at 268. 
 253. Id. at 271–72. 
 254. Id. at 271.  
 255. Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 256. See Kanu Okike et al., Conflict of Interest in Orthopaedic Research: An Asso-
ciation Between Findings and Funding in Scientific Presentations, 89 J. BONE JOINT & 
SURGERY AM. 608, 611 (2007) [https://perma.cc/6PUM-LEMM]. 
 257. Griffin, supra note 206, at 248.   
 258. Id.  
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cluding 100% of the surgeons with stock options, 98.4% of those with royal-
ties, and 97.8% of those who were employees of implant companies reporting 
positive outcomes in their scientific presentations.259  Another study found that 
published results were only usually reproducible if less than 25% of the pub-
lished data was reported by device developers when compared to data from the 
joint replacement registries.260  Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daub-
ert, the trial judge’s role is to “exclude unreliable expert testimony,” 261 and 
unreproducible studies are unreliable by definition.   
Orthopaedic journal editors consider it “essential that an author disclose 
potential conflicts of interest.”262  The American Academy of Orthopaedic Sur-
geons agrees and has a “Mandatory Disclosure Policy” for educational pro-
grams in which it requires presenters to disclose “relevant potentially conflict-
ing interests or commercial relationships.”263  Similarly, many orthopaedic 
journals – at least eighteen – have signed onto a consensus statement saying 
readers of medical journals are “entitled to a full disclosure of all financial con-
flicts of interest of the authors of those articles”264 and agreeing to use the uni-
versal disclosure form developed by the International Committee of Medical 
Journal Editors (“ICMJE”).265   
Similar to orthopaedic journal readers, judges and juries are entitled to 
full disclosure.  Courts should develop disclosure forms like the ICMJE uni-
versal disclosure form and require all medical experts to fill out and sign this 
form under penalty of perjury.266  Research has shown that even with disclosure 
policies in place, compliance can be an issue.  For example, one study showed 
“a 46% nondisclosure rate of conflicts of interest among thirty-two orthopaedic 
surgeons . . . who were known to have been paid over $1 million” in the year 
  
 259. Okike, supra note 256, at 611. 
 260. Gerold Labek et al., Impact of Implant Developers on Published Outcome and 
Reproducibility of Cohort-Based Clinical Studies in Arthroplasty, 93 J. BONE JOINT 
SURG. 55, 55 (2011). 
 261. FED. R. EVID. 702, advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment [hereinafter 
FRE 702 Committee Notes]; see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 
579, 579–93 (1993). 
 262. Vernon T. Tolo, Editorial, Orthopaedic Journals and Conflicts of Interest, 93 
J. BONE & JOINT SURGERY 2145, 2145 (2011). 
 263. AAOS Mandatory Disclosure Policy, AM. ACAD. OF ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS, 
https://www.aaos.org/About/disclosure/?ssopc=1 [https://perma.cc/K6VR-T82H] (last 
visited June 22, 2019). 
 264. Jeffrey S. Fischgrund, Conflict of Interest in Orthopaedic Journals, 20 J. AM. 
ACAD. ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS 263, 263 (2012).   
 265. See Conflicts of Interest, INT’L COMM. MED. J. EDITORS., http://www.ic-
mje.org/about-icmje/faqs/conflict-of-interest-disclosure-forms/ (last visited June 22, 
2019); Griffin, supra note 206, at 247. 
 266. Griffin, supra note 206, at 249.   
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before publication of their article.267  Therefore, the perjury penalty should 
have teeth.  
In addition, courts should stop deferring to industry polycentricity argu-
ments,268 where medical devices have a history of innovation leaps documented 
in their predicate chain that should be used to give plaintiffs’ experts a similar 
degree of deference.269  With the roadmap of the implant companies’ own leaps 
of “innovation” available in their 510(k) documentation, these conflicts are ca-
pable of rational resolution whether adjudication is easy or not.270  
b.  Stop Blame-Shifting Liability onto Hospitals and Doctors for Poorly Per-
forming 510(k) Devices 
Second, courts should stop allowing device-makers to shift blame to doc-
tors and hospitals for failure of poorly researched medical devices.  Unfortu-
nately, doctors and hospitals likely often pay the price for early device failures 
because the legal system makes malpractice claims much easier than product 
liability claims in these complex cases.  Device manufacturers often blame the 
operating surgeon – even their insider experts – for the failures of their medical 
devices.271  From a public policy standpoint, implant companies are in a much 
better position than the public or doctors and hospitals to reduce the hazards 
associated with their devices because the manufacturer can choose better pre-
market testing, can insure potential complications prospectively, and can per-
form better postmarket surveillance of its devices.   
As noted in Escola, “[P]ublic policy demands that responsibility be fixed 
wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent 
  
 267. Id. at 248; see also Kanu Okike et al., Accuracy of Conflict of Interest Disclo-
sures Reported by Physicians, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1466, 1471 (2009). 
 268. Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 98 (Utah 1991).  
 269. Griffin, supra note 206, at 262. 
 270. James A. Henderson Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturers’ Conscious Design 
Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1538 (1973). 
 271. See e.g., Barry Meier, Surgeon vs. Knee Maker: Who’s Rejecting Whom?, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 19, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/20/busi-
ness/20knee.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1 [perma.cc/RR23-S9HP] (noting the company 
suggested the surgeon’s “technique was the problem” when he reported problems with 
an implant Dr. Berger noted, “Suddenly, I went from someone who was their master 
teacher to someone who didn’t know what he was doing.”); Barry Meier, Doctors Who 
Don’t Speak Out, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2013), http://www.ny-
times.com/2013/02/17/sunday-review/the-hip-replacement-case-shows-why-doctors-
often-remain-silent.html [https://perma.cc/778G-QCZ6] (Dr. Dorr noted, ““The first 
thing that a company does is to put out a campaign that a surgeon does not know how 
to operate” when problems are reported with a device, and Dr. Dorr was the victim of 
a “whisper campaign”).  
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in defective products that reach the market.”272  Since 88% of orthopaedic de-
vices are cleared via the 501(k) shortcut compared to only 53% for other med-
ical devices, the orthopaedic device manufacturers must be making a calculated 
business decision to absorb the costs of the 11.5 times higher recall rate of 
devices cleared via this pathway with resultant predictable patient injuries.273  
Patients and society will benefit if the court system adjusts the calculus to make 
company executives consider more premarket testing to lower recall rates by 
placing risky devices through the PMA process prior to release on the general 
public.  Otherwise, “[t]he cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may 
be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured.”274  It is a cost that the 
implant companies should share and insure, since they are the ones who stand 
to profit from the new – not better – devices.  Doctors and hospitals should not 
bear the cost by default.     
C.  Congressional Action 
Congress should use programs already in place to encourage quality 
among hospitals, doctors, and nursing homes as models to similarly encourage 
quality among medical device makers.  A “Medicare 510(k) Payment Reduc-
tion Program” should be instituted to help offset the costs to Medicare of the 
11.5 times higher recall rate associated with orthopaedic 510(k) devices.275  In 
addition, the government should create a MedicalDeviceCompare.gov website 
to allow patients to participate in decision-making by comparing their medical 
devices to other devices in the same category.  Finally, residency programs 
funded by the government should be required to train young doctors to use 
proven devices instead of the latest 510(k) devices.   
1.  Introduction of a “Medicare 510(k) Payment Reduction Program” 
Congress could start a new program – possibly named the “Medicare 
510(k) Payment Reduction Program” – to offset the added costs to Medicare 
posed by 510(k) device recalls and other 510(k) issues276 by ensuring that Med-
icare pays less for 510(k) approved devices than for PMA devices.   
  
 272. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440–41 (Cal. 1944); see also, 
Griffin, supra note 206, at 268.   
 273. Day et al., supra note 2, at 517.   
 274. Escola, 150 P.2d at 440; see also, In re Wagner, 530 B.R. 695, 697 (E.D. Wis. 
2015). 
 275. Day et al., supra note 2, at 517. 
 276. See, e.g., discussion supra Section II.A (discussing tibial component of TKA).  
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Models for such a program are already in place.  The Affordable Care Act 
included the Hospital Readmission Reduction Program,277 the Hospital Ac-
quired Conditions Reduction Program,278 and the Value-Based Purchasing Pro-
gram,279 which all shifted extra costs associated with hospital issues away from 
government payers as described below.  Congress should institute similar pro-
grams for 510(k) approved orthopaedic devices due to their higher recall rates 
and associated costs.   
The Medicare Hospital Readmission Reduction Program (“HRRP”) cre-
ated by the ACA applies to most acute care hospitals.280  HRRP penalizes hos-
pitals by reducing their reimbursement rates from Medicare by up to 3% if they 
have “higher-than-expected readmission rates for a key set of conditions com-
mon in the Medicare population” and by making the penalty public.281   
Similarly, Medicare penalizes hospital acquired conditions under its Hos-
pital-Acquired Conditions Reduction Program, which focuses on reducing the 
incidence of adverse safety events in hospitals.282  Under the program, Medi-
care uses patient safety measures to assign hospitals a Total Hospital Acquired 
  
 277. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 (2010) (cod-
ified in part as 42 U.S.C. § 3025 (2012)). 
 278. See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww (2012). 
 279. § 1886(o). 
 280. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Social Risk Factors and Per-
formance Under Medicare’s Value-Based Purchasing Programs: A Report Required 
by the Improving Medicare-Post-Acute Care Transformation (IMPACT) Act of 2014, 
HHS REPORT TO CONGRESS 70 [hereinafter HHS Report]; see also, Patient Protection 
& Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1186(d)(1)(B) (2012); 42 C.F.R. § 412.152 (2019). 
 281. HHS Report, supra note 280, at 70 (noting the maximum penalty was set at 
3% in 2015, “where it will remain”); Cristina Boccuti and Giselle Casillas, Aiming for 
Fewer Hospital U-turns: The Medicare Hospital Readmission Reduction Program THE 
KAISER FAM. FOUND. MAR. 2017 ISSUE BRIEF 2 (2017), http://files.kff.org/attach-
ment/Issue-Brief-Fewer-Hospital-U-turns-The-Medicare-Hospital-Readmission-Re-
duction-Program [perma.cc/4LVJ-F23Z] (noting, “The HRRP was established by a 
provision in the Affordable Care Act (ACA) requiring Medicare to reduce payments to 
hospitals with relatively high readmission rates for patients in traditional Medicare.”).  
The HRRP is especially punitive because “hospitals with readmission rates that exceed 
the national average are penalized by a reduction in payments across all of their Medi-
care admissions – not just those which resulted in readmissions.” Id.  After some ad-
justments, each hospital is annually assigned a penalty for the upcoming year based on 
CMS’s calculation of that hospital’s rate of excess readmissions; “the greater each hos-
pital’s rate of excess readmissions, the higher its penalty.” Id.  The hospital’s penalty 
is posted in the Federal Register and listed on the Medicare website) Id.; see also Hos-
pital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP), CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID 
SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/medicare/medicare-fee-for-service-payment/acuteinpa-
tientpps/readmissions-reduction-program.html [perma.cc/4DKF-UP82] (last visited 
Feb. 6, 2019) (explaining that the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services uses “ex-
cess readmission ratios” to measure performance in treating conditions like chronic 
lung disease, heart attacks, pneumonia, and coronary artery bypass surgery).      
 282. HHS Report, supra note 280, at 100. 
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Conditions score and penalizes 25% of hospitals with the worst scores “a flat 
1% of their total inpatient Medicare revenues” – including 1% of dispropor-
tionate share payments and medical education payments.283   
Another example is Medicare’s Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Pro-
gram, which redistributes a percentage – up to 2% – of hospitals’ Medicare 
payments annually based on the hospital’s performance on quality measures 
like (1) “clinical outcomes (e.g., mortality for patients admitted with pneumo-
nia),” (2) “efficiency (costs of care per episode),” and (3) “safety measures 
(e.g., in-hospital infection rates).”284   
Given the 510(k) cost estimates above for the tibial component of TKAs 
(almost $100 billion as calculated above) and the fact that Medicare paid over 
$20 billion285 in 2010 for TKAs, the cost savings for TKAs alone could be 
substantial; this is especially true considering that over 3.4 million people per 
year (mostly paid for by Medicare) are expected to undergo TKAs annually by 
2030.286  Further, “Medicare is responsible for paying for over 70% of all TKA 
procedures in the United States.”287  
Using those existing programs as models, Medicare’s Payment Advisory 
Commission should review its payment policies and recommend lower pay-
ment rates for new 510(k) devices that threaten older established devices in 
stable device markets with proven long term outcomes related to certain de-
vices, like orthopaedic total knees and hips.288  Further, programs developed 
under the Medicare Shared Savings Program should reward surgeons and Ac-
countable Care Organizations who implant well-established devices while pe-
nalizing those who implant new, unproven 510(k) devices.289   
To determine which techniques are “proven” or well-established, payors 
should look to devices that have been approved by the PMA pathway over 
510(k) devices, should discount studies published by the developers of the de-
vice in favor of independent studies, and should rely on emerging American 
and established overseas registry databases.  First, payors should favor devices 
that the FDA approves by the PMA pathway over 510(k) devices by paying 
less for 510(k) approved devices in areas where PMA-approved devices are 
available.290  As noted earlier, the Institute of Medicine found that 510(k) is 
“flawed”291 and is not a “reliable premarket screen for safety and effectiveness” 
  
 283. Id.    
 284. Id. at 143 (noting cap was set at 2% for 2017 and beyond).   
 285. Eric M. Padegimas et al., Medicare Reimbursement for Total Joint Arthro-
plasty: The Driving Forces, 98 J. BONE AND JOINT SURGERY 1007, 1007 (2016).   
 286. Kurtz et al., supra note 102, at 782.    
 287. Lavernia et al., supra note 178, at 221.    
 288. 42 U.S.C. § 1395b-6(a)–(b) (2012).   
 289. § 1395jjj.   
 290. Day et al., supra note 2, at 522; Fargen, supra note 4, at 271. 
 291. IOM REPORT BRIEF, supra note 11, at 3. 
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for many devices.292  There is a much higher chance (11.5 times higher in or-
thopaedics)293 that a device will be recalled when it does not undergo more 
rigorous FDA approval through the PMA process; these recalls result in  addi-
tional costs and morbidity associated with (1) repeat surgeries for revision, (2) 
complications from those surgeries (such as DVT or infection), and (3) other 
add-on expenses to the payment system that could have been avoided had the 
new 510(k) device not been used.  Orthopaedic devices are much more likely 
to be cleared by shortcut FDA pathways than non-orthopaedic medical devices, 
with 88% of orthopaedic devices cleared by the 510(k) process in 2012 versus 
only 53% of nonorthopaedic devices.294  Payors should pay less for devices 
cleared via 510(k) than those cleared via PMA until those 510(k) devices have 
a proven track record.      
Second, in analyzing devices, payors should discount studies published 
by the developers of the devices and emphasize independent and registry stud-
ies when they assess the cost-effectiveness of medical devices.  The orthopae-
dic literature is unreliable and biased because an inherent “positive outcome 
bias” taints orthopaedic research when studies with positive outcomes have 
historically been preferentially published over negative or neutral studies.295   
Indeed, one study showed that 74% of published original papers reported pos-
itive outcomes,296 and another study estimated that 85% of orthopaedic epide-
miology studies “may assert biased conclusions.”297  This “publication bias” 
overestimates the clinical relevance of some orthopaedic implants by disre-
garding negative and neutral data that is not being published.298  Some authors 
consider this bias to be a “severe challenge to patient safety.”299  Further, re-
search quality is an issue with only 11.3% of orthopaedic studies using Level 
1 evidence (the most reliable) and only 3% being randomized, controlled trials 
(the gold standard for clinical research).300   
  
 292. Id. at 2; IOM REPORT, supra note 11, at 193. 
 293. Day et al., supra note 2, at 522. 
 294. Id. at 520. 
 295. Erik A. Hasenboehler et al., Bias Towards Publishing Positive Results in Or-
thopaedic and General Surgery: A Patient Safety Issue?, PATIENT SAFETY SURGERY 
(Nov. 2007). 
 296. Id. at 3–4.  
 297. Harman Chaudhry et al., How Good Is the Orthopaedic Literature?, 42 INDIAN 
J. ORTHOPAEDICS 144, 146 (2008). 
 298. Hasenboehler, supra note 295, at 4 (“[T]rials with ‘significant’ results were 
more likely to be published than studies with ‘non-significant’ data, by an adjusted 
odds-ratio of 12.30.”). 
 299. Id. at 2; see also Mohit Bhandari et al., Meta-Analyses in Orthopaedic Sur-
gery: A Systematic Review of Their Methodologies, 83 J. BONE AND JOINT SURG. 15, 15 
(2001); David Moher et al., Epidemiology and Reporting Characteristics of Systematic 
Reviews, 4 PLOS MED. 447, 455 (2007). 
 300. Chaudhry, supra note 298, at 146.   
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Payors must learn to recognize industry-paid showmen (often including 
doctors and lawyers) and look past their “razzle dazzle”301 to obtain solid in-
formation upon which to make decisions.  Surgeons on implant companies’ 
payrolls are biased in their public presentations – with one study showing that 
100% of those with stock options reported positive results.302  This is not sur-
prising when the companies are less interested in finding scientists and instead 
are “concerned only with identifying those surgeons who [are] the most likely 
to be good salespeople for [their] products.”303   
One way to overcome this bias is for payors to look to studies that involve 
less than 25% of the data reported by the developers of the implant because a 
recent study found “published results were usually reproducible in clinical 
practice if [less than] 25%” of the data was reported by the developers of the 
implant.304  In addition, payors should start looking more to registry data to 
analyze clinical effectiveness as a tool for postmarket surveillance of medical 
devices.305  The American Joint Replacement Registry is beginning to produce 
significant data with 612 hospitals enrolled by 2015 and over 427,000 cumula-
tive procedures followed in the database between 2012 and 2015.306  Other 
countries have well-established and long-standing databases that can also be 
analyzed.  For example, joint registries in the U.K. and Australia played a major 
role in detecting the problems associated with metal-on-metal hips.307  One au-
thor recently noted, “Registry data can contribute substantial added value to an 
informed discussion of arthroplasty outcomes.”308 
Before paying higher prices for new technology, payors should recognize 
that device manufacturers need to “hit a home run” in order to improve the 
already excellent outcomes for some procedures like TKA.  According to a 
study co-authored by researchers at Yale and Harvard, in order to be cost ef-
fective, an “innovative implant” must decrease actual TKA failure rates – not 
  
 301. BOB FOSSE AND FRED EBB, CHICAGO: THE MUSICAL.    
 302. Okike et al., supra note 256, at 610–11. 
 303. SARMIENTO, supra note 69, at 286.   
 304. Labek et al., supra note 260, at 55. 
 305. IOM REPORT, supra note 11, at 11. 
 306. Annual Report 2016, AM. JOINT REPLACEMENT REGISTRY 1, 6 (2016), 
http://www.ajrr.net/images/annual_reports/AJRR_2016_Annual_Report_final.pdf 
[perma.cc/4TQN-E4E8]; David Ayers & Patricia Franklin, Joint Replacement Regis-
tries in the United States: A New Paradigm, 96 J. BONE AND JOINT SURG. 1567, 1568 
(2014); All About the Data, AM. JOINT REPLACEMENT REGISTRY, 
https://www.ajrr.net/enroll-with-us/all-about-the-data [perma.cc/26B2-F56S] (last vis-
ited June 22, 2019).   
 307. Brent M. Ardaugh et al., The 510(k) Ancestry of a Metal-on-Metal Hip Im-
plant, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 97, 98 (2013). 
 308. Labek et al., supra note 260, at 55.   
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just radiographic wear – by at least 50%.309  If the patient has limited life ex-
pectancy due to comorbidities or advanced age, even higher success rates are 
required for broad cost effectiveness.310   
Therefore, reasonable clinical trials associated with PMA will likely be 
required to justify added expenses associated with devices now being approved 
using unproven 510(k) modifications.  Theoretical changes and marketing 
rarely, if ever, advance science.  Therefore, as outlined earlier in this paper, it 
is not surprising that changes to the tibial component of TKAs have led to bil-
lions of dollars of unnecessary costs.  Real improvements will almost always 
require hard work and real science – like clinical trials – and payors should stop 
paying more money for less science.   
2.  Start “MedicalDeviceCompare.gov” to Give the Public Access to 
Clearance Pathway Information and Statistics 
Transparency is important.  Oliver Wendell Holmes once noted, “When 
you get the dragon out of his cave on to the plain and in the daylight, you can 
count his teeth and claws, and see just what is his strength.”311  Louis Brandeis 
also noted, “Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the 
most efficient policeman.”312   
Congress seems to have adopted the transparency philosophy behind 
these famous mantras because it adopted public websites allowing the public 
to compare hospitals (i.e., HospitalCompare.gov),313 nursing homes (i.e., 
NursingHomeCompare.gov),314 and physicians (i.e., PhysicianCom-
pare.gov).315  Why not adopt similar websites allowing patients to compare the 
clearance pathway and reported results for orthopaedic (and other) medical de-
vices and call it “MedicalDeviceCompare.gov”?  Such a website would allow 
market forces to influence device makers decisions regarding clearance path-
way and pursuit of valid clinical data.   
  
 309. Lisa G. Suter et al., Placing a Price on Medical Device Innovation: The Ex-
ample of Total Knee Arthroplasty, 8(5) PLoS ONE e62709 7 (May 2013). 
 310. Id.  
 311. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 
(1897).   
 312. Justice Louis D. Brandeis, BRANDEIS U., https://www.brandeis.edu/legacy-
fund/bio.html [perma.cc/9XYN-6FX8] (last visited June 22, 2019).   
 313. See Hospital Compare, CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., 
https://www.medicare.gov/hospitalcompare/search.html? [perma.cc/N84Y-RWLR] 
(last visited June 22, 2019). 
 314. See Nursing Home Compare, CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., 
https://www.medicare.gov/nursinghomecompare/search.html? [perma.cc/ML6Q-
SJV6] (last visited June 22, 2019). 
 315. See Physician Compare, CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., 
https://www.medicare.gov/physiciancompare/ [perma.cc/5XPK-H3JY] (last visited 
June 22, 2019). 
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3.  Medicare Should Make Sure Future Doctors Are Trained Preferen-
tially Using Proven Medical Devices 
Orthopaedic surgeons theoretically control which devices become popu-
lar and are implanted.  Therefore, proper unbiased education – so that individ-
ual surgeons have a solid foundation upon which to make implant choices – is 
essential to providing quality patient-centered care.  Unfortunately, today’s 
surgeons are often trained to use the newest devices – whether they are better 
for the patient or not.316  Medicare and the Accreditation Council of Graduate 
Medical Education (“ACGME”) are in the best position to regulate surgeon 
training requirements because Medicare pays for training doctors (and later 
pays for the implant choices of those same doctors) and ACGME oversees sur-
geon training programs.317   
First, Medicare should get involved because Medicare pays both for doc-
tor training318 and for the end results when bad device choices are made;319 
therefore, the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) and Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) should take a greater regulatory 
interest in this area.  Better surgeon training on the front-end rewards Medi-
care’s investment in physician training when those doctors perform patient-
centered procedures later in their careers on Medicare patients.   
Medicare is the “largest single program providing explicit support for 
graduate medical education” paying an estimated $112,642 per resident trained 
in 2010 with Medicare residency subsidies totaling over $10.1 billion annu-
ally.320  Further, two of the most expensive conditions billed to Medicare in 
2013 included “complication of device, implant or graft” (costing Medicare 
around $7.1 billion) and “complications of surgical procedures or medical 
  
 316. SARMIENTO, supra note 69, at 284 (asserting that medicine functions primarily 
as a “marketing arm of industry”); Anglen & Weinstein, supra note 139, at 705–06 
(noting residents being preferentially trained in the device with poorer results).  Like-
wise, as an example in my personal experience, I was trained to use modular tibial 
components and have never personally witnessed any surgeon implant an all-poly tibia.   
 317. What We Do, AM. COUNCIL FOR GRADUATE MED. EDUC., https://www.ac-
gme.org/What-We-Do/Overview (last visited June 22, 2019) [hereinafter ACGME].   
 318. Catherine Rampell, How Medicare Subsidizes Doctor Training, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 17, 2013), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/12/17/how-medicare-subsi-
dizes-doctor-training/?_r=0 [perma.cc/Y8TW-MQ5L].   
 319. Lavernia et al., supra note 178, at 221 (noting that Medicare pays for over 70% 
of TKAs in the U.S.).   
 320. Medicare Payments for Graduate Medical Education: What Every Medical 
Student, Resident, and Advisor Needs to Know, ASS’N OF AM. MED. CS., https://mem-
bers.aamc.org/eweb/upload/Medicare%20Payments%20For%20Gradu-
ate%20Med%20Ed.pdf [perma.cc/G27J-V5RY] (last visited June 22, 2019); Rampell, 
supra note 318.   
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care” (costing an additional $2.9 billion)321 – both of which likely involved a 
significant number of TKAs and other implants.322   
Medicare is facing financial hardship.323  Concern over the increasing 
Medicare expenditures related to TKA led CMS to implement reductions in 
payment for physician services and hospitals for TKA.324  Specifically, surgeon 
per-case reimbursement for TKA fell from “approximately $3000 in 1995 to 
$1560 in 2009.”325  Growth projections for coming years indicate Medicare’s 
TKA burden is going to get heavier.326  Therefore, funding for orthopaedic res-
idency training programs tied to Medicare should be prefaced upon training 
programs teaching residents techniques that are cost-effective and beneficial to 
Medicare beneficiaries – not techniques that lead to higher costs, more revision 
surgeries, and poorer health for its Medicare patients.  
Medicare funding for graduate medical education flows to teaching hos-
pitals through two separate streams: (1) Direct Graduate Medical Education 
(“DGME”) funding covers resident and faculty salaries and benefits along with 
some other overhead costs, and (2) Indirect Medical Education (“IME”) fund-
ing bolsters payments to teaching hospitals by adjusting individual hospitals’ 
inpatient rates to help defray additional costs associated with sponsoring resi-
dency programs.327  In 2010, IME payments accounted for 71% of the Medi-
care payments to teaching hospitals.328  IME payments are already adjusted 
based on differences in local wages, disproportionate share of low-income pa-
tients, and other factors.   
  
 321. Celeste M. Torio & Brian J. Moore, National Inpatient Hospital Costs: The 
Most Expensive Conditions by Payor, 2013, HEALTHCARE COST AND UTILIZATION 
PROJECT STATISTICAL BRIEF 204 (May 2016), https://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/re-
ports/statbriefs/sb204-Most-Expensive-Hospital-Conditions.pdf [perma.cc/FP32-
9PGW]. 
 322. Id. 
 323. Nick Timiraos, Social Security, Medicare Face Insolvency Over 20 Years, 
Trustees Report,  
WALL ST. J. (June 22, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/social-security-medicare-
trust-funds-face-insolvency-over-20-years-trustees-report-1466605893 
[perma.cc/35BG-LXK3]. 
 324. Iorio et al., supra note 99, at 269.   
 325. P.B. Derman et al., The Role of Overweight and Obesity in Relation to the 
More Rapid Growth of Total Knee Arthroplasty Volume Compared with Total Hip Ar-
throplasty Volume, 96 J. BONE & JOINT SURG. 926, 924 (2014).   
 326. Kurtz et al., supra note 102, at 782. 
 327. Graduate Medical Education that Meets the Nation’s Health Needs: GME Fi-
nancing, NAT’L CTR. FOR BIOTECH. INFO., U.S. NAT’L LIBR. OF MED., 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK248024/ [perma.cc/8MTA-EXCE] (last vis-
ited June 2, 2019).     
 328. Id. (“Of the $9.6 billion Medicare paid to acute care teaching hospitals for 
GME in 2010, about $6.8 billion (70.8 percent) were via the IME adjustment and $2.8 
billion via DGME payments (29.2 percent).”).   
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To improve surgeon training, HHS should add adjustments to the IME 
payments based upon whether surgeons are being trained in proven, effective 
medical device use.  Residency training programs that demonstrate residents 
are not being preferentially trained in newer, unproven 510(k) pathway devices 
over older, proven, cheaper devices should get higher IME payments than those 
that are exclusively training their residents to use more expensive and unproven 
510(k) devices.  In addition, Medicare could link IME payments to training in 
procedures and devices that the Medicare Payment Advisory Committee eval-
uates and chooses.329  A board similar to the former Independent Payment Ad-
visory Board330 or some other board or committee that could be charged with 
device review.  Medicare should stop indiscriminately paying for resident ed-
ucation in the newest and most expensive unproven techniques in order to help 
solve long-term funding issues and ensure Medicare’s long-term viability.   
Second, accreditation of residency training programs should be based on 
training young surgeons to use proven techniques and devices.  The ACGME 
is a private, 501(c)(3), nonprofit organization that sets standards for U.S. grad-
uate medical education in surgical (and other) residency programs.331  The 
ACGME bases accreditation decisions on compliance with those standards.332  
Standards should be added requiring training in best proven techniques and 
devices, not just the newest 510(k) devices.  Specific lists of proven device 
classifications and techniques should be added to ACGME’s “Institutional and 
Program Requirements” 333 as quality standards and chosen by independent or-
ganizations (like perhaps the ABOS334 and the AAMC335) acting as patient ad-
vocates.  In the 2015-16 academic year, 830 ACGME-accredited institutions 
sponsored around 10,000 residency and fellowship programs covering 150 spe-
cialties and subspecialties336 – making ACGME a potential powerful force for 
change in this area.   
ACGME accreditation should also be prefaced upon efforts by residency 
training programs to eliminate industry influence upon professors and teaching 
hospitals.  In 2003, Professor Augusto Sarmiento wrote, “I feel comfortable in 
stating that the education of today’s orthopedists is structured, to a great ex-
tent, to satisfy the marketing needs of industry,” adding that orthopaedic resi-
dents simply “learn to use industry’s tools.” 337   
  
 329. 42 U.S.C. § 1395b-6(a)–(b) (2012).   
 330. 42 U.S.C. § 1395kkk (repealed Feb. 9, 2018).  
 331. ACGME, supra note 317.   
 332. Id.     
 333. Id.    
 334. About ABOS, AM. BOARD OF ORTHOPAEDIC SURGERY, 
https://www.abos.org/about-abos.aspx [perma.cc/WGU2-TXLE] (last visited June 2, 
2019).   
 335. About the AAMC, ASS’N OF AM. MED. CS., https://www.aamc.org/about 
[perma.cc/55QR-Z7YN] (last visited June 2, 2019). 
 336. ACGME, supra note 317.   
 337. SARMIENTO, supra note 69, at 284 (emphasis added). 
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Sarmiento’s observations appear to be validated by the findings of the 
Research Committee (“Committee”) of the American Board of Orthopaedic 
Surgeons (“ABOS”) in a 2008 article finding a “striking shift” to a new device 
(“Nail”); this “shift” resulted in a 2133% increase in market share by newly 
trained orthopaedic surgeons fixing hip fractures from an older proven device 
(the “Plate”) although scientific findings did not support the shift – as described 
above in section II.A.3.338  The Committee noted that the “consensus from the 
orthopaedic literature” was that the “shift” to the Nail was “associated with a 
higher complication rate and no better outcomes,”339 in addition to “higher im-
plant costs and surgeon fees.”340  The Committee acknowledged the role of 
resident education in the “striking shift.”  To explain the shift, the Committee 
noted that, “[i]t may be that younger surgeons are responding to a change in 
training and that for some reason residents are currently being trained prefer-
entially in [the Nail].”341  Young orthopaedic surgeons likely perform the pro-
cedures that they learned in residency training, and Sarmiento observed that 
device manufacturers probably control that education process.342  In 2015, 
companies gave $6.5 billion to doctors and teaching hospitals influencing re-
search and patient care at academic medical centers.343 
Orthopaedic residents likely “accept the reality . . . presented” during their 
residency training programs by their attending professors – like Truman in The 
Truman Show.344  Accrediting organizations, like ACGME, must do a better 
job ensuring that at least some of the “reality” taught to residents is based upon 
sound scientific evidence regarding safety and effectiveness and therefore, 
likely to lead to reliable and good patient outcomes.345   
Together, Medicare and ACGME are in the best position to help fix the 
problem of newer, more expensive, and worse performing devices becoming 
standard of care in the orthopaedic community.   
  
 338. Anglen & Weinstein, supra note 139, at 704–06 (noting “our data, which were 
collected from young orthopaedic surgeons in the beginning of their careers, confirm a 
higher rate of fracture and procedure-related complications and, at best, equivalent pain 
and deformity scores at the time of follow-up for patients managed with intramedullary 
nail fixation.” and “higher implant costs and surgeon fees, with no improvement in 
patient outcomes”). 
 339. Id. at 705 (emphasis added). 
 340. Id. at 706.  
 341. Id. (emphasis added).   
 342. Griffin, supra note 206, at 209; SARMIENTO, supra note 69, at 200-01.    
 343. Chad Terhune, University of California OKs $8.5 Million Payout in Spine Sur-
gery Cases, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Aug. 1, 2016), http://khn.org/news/university-of-
california-oks-8-5-million-payout-in-spine-surgery-cases [perma.cc/BUY5-RY37] 
(last visited June 22, 2019) (commenting on federal data). 
 344. THE TRUMAN SHOW (Paramount Pictures 1998). 
 345. Griffin, supra note 206, at 209. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Even though it is not sexy, policymakers would be wise to remember the 
maxim, “The enemy of good is better,” and reign in the physical and financial 
devastation left in the path of medical device “races” facilitated by easy 510(k) 
pathways to device approval.  There is little if any evidence that 510(k) facili-
tates real innovation.  In fact, for orthopaedic devices, 510(k)’s past is check-
ered at best.  Instead of facilitating innovation, there is evidence that orthopae-
dic 510(k) devices are 11.5 times more likely to be recalled than PMA de-
vices.346  Similarly, there is evidence that 510(k) TKA devices have historically 
not outperformed their predicate ancestors.347  In addition, some 510(k) outlier 
devices unexpectedly underperform almost immediately and lead to relatively 
quick legal attention, but not before many lives are negatively altered unneces-
sarily.348   
The FDA changes to 510(k) could positively impact its shortcomings if 
(1) a less deferential approach is taken toward device manufacturers, (2) more 
information is required specific to safety and efficacy of the new device before 
approval, (3) more emphasis is placed on risk benefit analysis and including 
statistical analysis using simple math with comparison of existing proven de-
vices, and (4) more orthopaedic devices are reclassified into Class III.   
However, even these changes alone are unlikely to meet the goals of the 
IOM’s recommendations regarding replacement of 510(k).  Therefore, courts 
should get involved by ensuring fairness in medical device products liability 
and malpractice litigation by including medical device information in the in-
formed consent process and by fairly analyzing witnesses on both sides in 
Daubert rulings.  Finally, Congress does not seem to have the appetite to re-
place 510(k) as recommended by the IOM, so it should take the following ac-
tions: (1) introduce a “Medicare 510(k) Payment Reduction Program” to hold 
device manufacturers more accountable for the patient outcome costs of 510(k) 
similar to other programs holding hospitals, doctors, and nursing homes re-
sponsible for added costs associated with the care delivered; (2) start “Medi-
calDeviceCompare.gov” to improve transparency by giving patients access to 
device information similar to that provided for hospitals, doctors, and nursing 
homes on HospitalCompare.gov, PhysicianCompare.gov, and NursingHome-
Compare.gov; and (3) shore up medical education funding to ensure that Med-
icare pays for residency training programs that train surgeons to use proven 
medical devices instead of the latest sexy 510(k) device.   
With the changes outlined in this paper, orthopaedic medical devices 




 346. Day et al., supra note 2, at 517. 
 347. Kremers et al., supra note 73; Mohan et al., supra note 168.   
 348. See discussion supra Section II.A. 
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APPENDIX A:  ESTIMATED NUMBERS OF TKAS PERFORMED IN THE 
U.S.  
FROM 1990 THROUGH 2017. 
Year # of TKAs Source 
           2017    966,000 349 







2012 700064 354 
2011 689381 355 







2006 533448 360 
2005 524223 361 




 349. IDATA RESEARCH, supra note 101. 
 350. Martin et al., supra note 176.    
 351. Estimation: midpoint between 2014 and 2016 numbers.   
 352. HEALTHCARE COST AND UTILIZATION PROJECT, FAST STATS: MOST COMMON 
OPERATIONS DURING INPATIENT STAYS, https://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/faststats/Na-
tionalProceduresServlet [perma.cc/6XHY-F6NK] (last visited June 2, 2019). 
 353. Id. (Year 2013).   
 354. Id. (Year 2012). 
 355. Id. (Year 2011). 
 356. Id. (Year 2010).   
 357. Id. (Year 2009).    
 358. Id. (Year 2008).   
 359. Id. (Year 2007).   
 360. Id. (Year 2006). 
 361. Id. (Year 2005). 
 362. C. Allison Russo et al., HEALTHCARE COST AND UTILIZATION PROJECT 
STATISTICAL BRIEF #28, PROCEDURES WITH THE MOST RAPIDLY INCREASING HOSPITAL 
COSTS, 2000–2004 6 (2007), https://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/reports/statbriefs/sb28.pdf 
[perma.cc/85HJ-K4SW].  
 363. Kathryn R. Fingar et al., HEALTHCARE COST AND UTILIZATION PROJECT, 
STATISTICAL BRIEF #186 MOST FREQUENT OPERATING ROOM PROCEDURES PERFORMED 
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2002 407100 364 





1998 309200 368 
1997 329000 369 
1996 301794 370 





1992 192966 374 
1991 165759 375 
1990 138552 376 




IN U.S. HOSPITALS, 2003–2012 4 (2014), https://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/reports/stat-
briefs/sb186-Operating-Room-Procedures-United-States-2012.pdf [perma.cc/P3CM-
CXJP].   
 364. Chaya Merrill et al., Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project, Statistical Brief 
#34, Hospital Stays Involving Musculoskeletal Procedures, 1997–2005 8 (2007) 
https://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/reports/statbriefs/sb34.pdf [perma.cc/DY8U-EKW8]. 
 365. Audrey J. Weiss et al., Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project, Statistical Brief 
#171, Trends in Operating Room Procedures in U.S. Hospitals, 2001–2013 3 (2014), 
https://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/reports/statbriefs/sb171-Operating-Room-Procedure-
Trends.pdf [perma.cc/U2C7-5G4M]. 
 366. Russo et al., supra note 365, at 6. 
 367. Merrill et al., supra note 367, at 8. 
 368. Id.     
 369. Anne Pfuntner et al., HEALTHCARE COST AND UTILIZATION PROJECT, 
STATISTICAL BRIEF #149, MOST FREQUENT PROCEDURES PERFORMED IN U.S. 
HOSPITALS, 2010 2 (2013) https://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/reports/statbriefs/sb149.pdf 
[perma.cc/H9DV-TZSC]. 
 370. 1991 through 1996 were estimated by assuming a linear progression from the 
138,552 cases in 1990 to the 329,000 in 1997.   
 371. Id.   
 372. Id.   
 373. Id.   
 374. Id.   
 375. Id.   
 376. Iorio et al., supra note 99, at 269.   
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